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A FUNNY THING HAPPENED TO THE (NON)PUBLIC
FORUM: LEBRON V. NATIONAL RAILROAD
PASSENGER CORPORATION"
Jonathan Bloomt
In November 1992 Michael A. Lebron, a commercial art
director and occasional creator of politically pointed artworks
for public spaces, 1 signed a contract with Transportation
Displays Incorporated ("TDF) to display one of his pieces on
the Spectacular, the most prominent advertising space in New
Yorks Penn Station. Lebron's proposed "advertorial" was a
parody of a Coors beer advertisement with text critical of the
Coors family for supporting various right-wing causes,
including that of the contras in Nicaragua. Yet in the spring of
* @1996 Jonathan Bloom. All Rights Reserved.
t Associate, Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP; J.D., New York University School of
Law, 1991. Mr. Bloom is one of Mr. Lebron's attorneys. The author gratefully
acknowledges the assistance of'David D. Cole, Gloria C. Phares and Bernadette M.
Ezring, who also represent Mr. Lebron, in the preparation of this article.
' Lebron has stated that an important goal of his work is to "responsibly
engage the public in important political or social issues, which I seek to achieve
by placing my works in mass transit stations where I can reach a wide audience?
Affidavit of Michael Lebron T 2, Dec. 29, 1992, submitted in support of his motion
for a temporary restraining order, Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 811 F.
Supp. 993 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) [hereinafter Lebron 11, 69 F.3d 650 (2d Cir. 1995),
amended, rehg denied, 74 F.3d 371 (2d Cir. 1995), cert denied, 116 S. Ct. 1675
(1996).
Lebron previously displayed political works in the Washington, D.C. subway
system. In 1984, Lebron was involved in a lawsuit with the Washington
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority ("WMATA) after WMATA tried to suppress a
poster photomontage Lebron installed in the Washington subway critical of the
Reagan administration on the ground that it was "deceptive." Lebron v.
Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 749 F.2d 893, 894 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that WMATA'a refusal to display the
poster because of its content violated the First Amendment. Id.
In 1987, shortly after the Iran-Contra hearings, Lebron installed in
advertising space in Washington subway stations a series of 25 works comprised of
drawings by Nicaraguan children, photographs and text that described the impact
of the war in Nicaragua on that country's children.
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1996, with civil war in Nicaragua receding from memory,
Lebron still was attempting to establish his First Amendment
right to display the work.2
In the course of his legal battle, Lebron was able to
convince the U.S. Supreme Court that Amtrak, which owns
Penn Station and controls access to the Spectacular, is a
government agency subject to the First Amendment But he
was unable to convince the Second Circuit that Amtrak
violated his First Amendment rights when it denied him access
to the Spectacular by asserting, for the first time, an unwritten
policy against "political" advertising.4
Lebron's effort to express his political views in dramatic
fashion in one of New York's most heavily trafficked public
spaces met with strong resistance from a Second Circuit panel
that seemed determined to deny him that right.
Notwithstanding the findings of then District Judge Pierre N.
Leval that Amtrak's purported policy against "political"
advertising was unwritten, inconsistently applied, vague and
possibly (depending upon the actual content of the policy)
viewpoint-biased,5 a panel majority consisting of Judges
Mahoney and Lumbard, over a dissent by Chief Judge
Newman, held that because Amtrak had never opened the
Spectacular to noncommercial advertising, it could exclude
Lebron's advertisement. The court of appeals also held that
Amtrak's policy was not facially unconstitutional.
At the heart of the court of appeals' ruling was its finding
that the relevant forum for purposes of Lebron's First
Amendment claims was the Spectacular, and that the
Spectacular is a nonpublic forum or a limited public forum for
commercial speech only. The court's resistance to second-
guessing Amtrak's determination that Lebron's advertisement
was not appropriate for the Spectacular was reflected in its
2 On May 13, 1996, the Supreme Court denied Lebron's second petition for a
writ of certiorari. Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 116 S. Ct. 1675 (1996).
' Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 115 S. Ct. 961 (1995).
Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 69 F.3d 650 (2d Cir.) (hereinafter
Lebron I, amended, reh'g denied, 74 F.3d 371 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 1675 (1996).
' Lebron I, 811 F. Supp. at 1000-04 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), rev'd, remanded, 12 F.3d
388 (2d Cir. 1993), rev'd, remanded, 115 S. Ct. 961 (1995), on remand, rev'd,
remanded, 69 F.3d 650 (2d Cir. 1995), amended, reh'g denied, 74 F.3d 371 (2d Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1675 (1996).
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disregard of unchallenged factual findings concerning the scope
and interpretation of Amtrak's policy and in its reliance upon
other nonpublic forum decisions having limited relevance to
the case at hand. The courts unduly narrow view of the
relevant forum and its highly deferential view of Amtrak's role
as proprietor of the station formed the basis for upholding
Amtrak's suppression of Lebron's political advertisement
despite Amtrak's having permitted other political
advertisements elsewhere in the station under the same policy.
The court's flawed application of the public forum doctrine
produced a result that exposes the starkly speech-restrictive
possibilities of that doctrine as currently formulated. The
decision below should have been afied without even
reaching forum analysis, but the court instead engaged in
forum analysis as a means of evading the glaring
constitutional defects in Amtrak's policy.7
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Section I of this Article reviews the factual and procedural
background of the case, and includes a summary of the Second
Circuit decisions analyzed in detail in the remainder of the
Article. Section 11 discusses the Second Circuit's two rulings on
the merits-its rejection of Lebron's First Amendment claims
and its denial of his petition for rehearing-issue by issue,
beginning with its evaluation of the policy itself and followed
by the court's public forum analysis. The Article concludes that
the court's undue reliance upon, and overly narrow interpreta-
tion of, the public forum doctrine, combined with a disregard of
pertinent aspects of the factual record, improperly denied
Lebron the right to display his work.
6 The courts public forum analysis produced the odd result that political
speech, which traditionally has been accorded the highest level of First
Amendment protection, was excluded from one of New York's most widely used
indoor public spaces, whereas a sexually suggestive commercial advertisment for
jeans was permitted in exactly the same space without incident or issue. See Boos
v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318 (1988); see also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
1 This Article will focus on the Second Circuit's consideration of Lebron's First
Amendment claim and will not address its analysis of the state action issue.
1996]
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A. Lebron's Work
The art installation/advertisement around which the dis-
pute centered features the caption "IS IT THE RIGHT'S BEER
NOW?," a parody of the then .current Coors beer advertising
slogan "ITS THE RIGHT BEER NOW." The work is a montage
of photographs and text that uses verbal and visual parody of a
typical Coors beer billboard advertisement in order to criticize
the Coors family's financial support of right-wing political
causes, which are identified in the text, including the Nica-
raguan contras. The caption appears over a photomontage that
depicts, on the left, a buoyant group of young Americans party-
ing, each holding a can of Coors beer, and on the right, a dark-
er scene showing a group of Nicaraguans looking apprehensive-
ly in the direction of the American beer drinkers. Linking the
two scenes is a can of Coors beer with a comet tail shooting out
behind it-a parody of the Coors "silver bullet"-which sug-
gests a missile and symbolizes U.S. financial and military
support for the Nicaraguan contras. Lebron's accompanying
text, which appears to the left of these images and is superim-
posed on an image of the American flag, connects the profits
made by the Coors Brewing Company and its owners with the
right-wing causes supported by Coors family members and the
Coors Foundation. Specifically, it mentions that Joseph Coors
financed the purchase of an aircraft for the Nicaraguan
contras, and it lists several right-wing groups which are sup-
ported by the Coors family.8 Text along the lower left edge of
the work states: "This art installation is an advertisement paid
for by Michael Lebron and produced by the ATW Communi-
cations Group."
By using the format of an actual beer advertisement,
Lebron aimed to awaken the viewer to the connection between
the sanitized, carefree image of American leisure represented
in such advertisements and the civil war in Nicaragua, with
which the corporate profits flowing from such advertisements,
in the case of Coors beer, are directly linked.9
S The organizations listed are The National Forum Foundation, Morality in
Media, The Heritage Foundation and The Free Congress Foundation. The sources
for all of the factual statements contained in the advertisement are referenced in
footnotes which appear along the top center portion of the advertisement.
' The genesis of the project dates to the spring of 1987, when Lebron spent
[Vol. 62:693
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B. The Site
The Spectacular is a long, curved, back-lit advertising
display area, approximately 103 feet long and 10 feet high. It
is located above a circular crossing area known as the rotunda
on the upper level of Penn Station above the entrance to the
Amtrak waiting room and ticketing area. Lebron rode Amtrak
frequently to and from Penn Station, and he selected the Spec-
tacular as the ideal place to display the ambitious work he was
contemplating. Penn Station, which is owned by Amtrak, is
one of the busiest public crossroads of pedestrian traffic in
New York. Approximately 200,000 people pass through the
station every day going to and from the Amtrak, New Jersey
Transit and Long Island Railroad trains that use the station,
and the New York City subway that abuts it."0 The Spectacu-
lar is the most prominent advertising location in the station
and, indeed, one of the most prominent in New York, and it is
visible to a large segment of the travelling public using Penn
Station. For this reason, Lebron created his work specifically
for the Spectacular. The unique dimensions of the site are such
that the work, conceived and created with the Spectacular in
mind after Lebron was told that the space would be available,
was unsuitable for display at any other location. For Lebron,
the Spectacular provided not only the scale necessary to accom-
modate the multiple visual components of his work, but also a
spatial context in which viewers had room to stop and read the
three weeks in the war zone in Nicaragua, where he was witness to a war which
at the time was being supported by the United States government in the form of
aid to the contras. After this visit, on May 21, 1987, Lebron saw Joseph Coors,
president of the Coors Brewing Company, testify in support of continued funding
for the contras during the congressional Iran-Contra hearings. Lebron learned from
this testimony that Coors himself had purchased an aircraft for the contras.
Through further investigation, Mr. Lebron learned that the Coors family, through
the Coors Foundation, was spending millions of dollars annually to support right-
wing groups such as The National Forum Foundation, Morality in Media, The
Heritage Foundation and The Free Congress Foundation. Lebron's surprise at
learning that profits earned from the sale of beer were being used to support the
war in Nicaragua, as well as other causes associated with the Moral Majority and
the policies of the Reagan administration, inspired the idea to create a public art
installation to bring these facts to the attention of the public.
" Streetwatch v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 875 F. Supp. 1055, 1057
(S.D.N.Y. 1995).
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text, which would not have been possible at other available
sites, such as on a highway billboard or a large billboard at the
World Trade Center visible only from a moving escalator.
C. The Contract Negotiations
Lebron first contacted TDI about contracting for billboard
space in Penn Station in August 1991. William B. Schwartz,
the TDI account executive with whom he negotiated, told
Lebron that while no displays would be accepted that included
obscenity or violence, there were no other policy restrictions on
advertising."
Lebron and TDI reached agreement on a contract for the
Spectacular for January and February 1993 at a rate of
$18,500 per month. In August 1992, Schwartz gave Lebron the
standard rental form contract, which Lebron signed and re-
turned. 2 During the negotiations, when Schwartz asked
Lebron what he would display on the billboard, Lebron re-
sponded that in general his work was political, although it
often looked like advertising, but that until negotiations were
concluded he regarded the specific content of the work as confi-
dential." Schwartz did not indicate that there was any prohi-
bition on political advertisements on the Spectacular or any-
where else in Penn Station. 4
TDI signed the contract on November 30, 1992. The con-
tract included the following terms:
All advertising copy is subject to approval of TDI and the
Transportation Facility concerned (i.e., the owner of the billboard) as
to character, text, illustration, design and operation.
If for any cause beyond its control TDI shall cease to have the
right to continue the advertising covered by this contract, or if the
Transportation Facility concerned should deem such advertising
objectionable for any reason, TDI shall have the right to terminate
the contract and discontinue the service without notice."5
1 Lebron I, 811 F. Supp. at 995.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
" Id. Although neither Lebron nor Schwartz knew it at the time, the "Trans-
portation Facility" referred to in the contract was Amtrak.
[Vol. 62: 693
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On December 2, 1992, Lebron provided TDI with a color photo-
copy of his piece for review. 6
D. The Rejection of Lebron's Proposed Advertisement
On December 7, TDI forwarded Lebron's work to Amtrak
for approval. On December 17, Anthony DeAngelo, Amtrak's
Vice President for Real Estate and Operations Development,
who was authorized by Amtrak's Board of Directors to oversee
advertising located on Amtrak property, rejected Lebron's ad-
vertisement on the grounds that it was "political." 7 Amtrak
notified TDI of this decision on December 23, in a letter which
stated that "Amtrak's policy is that it will not allow political
advertising on the [Sipectacular advertising sign.""' Lebron
was not notified of Amtrak's rejection from TDI until December
29, 1992, three days before his advertisement was to appear on
the Spectacular.'
At the time Lebron's advertisement was rejected, a variety
of other advertisements appeared on the walls and on kiosks in
the immediate vicinity of the Spectacular. Appearing on a
kiosk in front of the Spectacular in the rotunda was an adver-
tisement for, and accompanying free copies of, The Plain
Truth, a magazine devoted to discussion of social and political
issues published by the fundamentalist Christian group The
World Wide Church of God.
E. The District Court Proceedings
Lebron promptly filed suit in the Southern District of New
York, seeking an order preliminarily and permanently enjoin-
ing Amtrak and TDI from violating his First and Fifth Amend-
ment rights and seeking specific performance of the contract.
After expedited discovery, the case was tried on January 27,
1993, with the parties having stipulated to submit witness tes-
timony through deposition transcripts.
,6 Lebron I, 811 F. Supp at 995.
1Id.
1 Id.
L9Id.
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On February 5, 1993, the district court ruled that 'in re-
jecting [Lebron's] contract to display his art on its billboard
Amtrak was engaged in governmental action and.., the stan-
dards employed by Amtrak in rejecting his work violated its
obligations under the First Amendment."20 The court ordered
defendants to give Lebron immediate access to the billboard in
accordance with the contract.
There were several independently sufficient grounds upon
which the district court held that Amtrak had violated the
First Amendment. The court noted that when the government
regulates speech 'it must do so by a policy that is (i) clearly set
forth, (ii) not so vague as to be subject to abuse, (iii) consistent-
ly applied and (iv) not based on viewpoint."2' As the court ex-
plained, "these rules are intended to avoid the risk that gov-
ernment may impose arbitrary, discriminatory, or preferential
controls on speech. Without explicit standards, clearly dis-
closed government regulation of speech may be applied in an
arbitrary and discriminatory manner.
"22
The court found that Amtrak had violated at least three,
and possibly four, of these constitutional requirements. First,
the court found that Amtrak's policy was not clearly set forth.
Indeed, the court found that the asserted policy against "politi-
cal" advertising was unwritten.' Moreover, the existence of
the policy had not been disseminated.24 Deposition testimony
revealed that executives of TDI, Amtrak's leasing agent for
advertising space in Penn Station, were not even aware of the
policy's existence.' Even William P. Delaney, a project man-
ager in Amtrak's Real Estate Department who was responsible
20 Id. at 1005.
21 Lebron I, 811 F. Supp. at 995.
Id. (citation omitted).
" Id. A 1980 contract between Amtrak and TDI provided that Amtrak could
refuse any advertising that it deemed "unlawful, immoral, improper or offensive to
good taste . . . or involve[s] political or other views which could result in dissen-
sion or involve [Amtrak] in dissension, complaints or controversy with its patrons
or the public . . . ." Id. at 1002. The court noted, however, that the contract was
no longer in effect, having been superseded by virtually unbounded language al-
lowing Amtrak to deny any advertising "at its own discretion." The court noted
that this "broad provision clearly does not state, or even imply, the rejection of all
'political' advertising." Id-
24 Id. at 1001.
25 Id
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for supervising Amtrak's arrangements with TDI for advertis-
ing in Amtrak's facilities, was unaware of a ban on "political"
advertising.26
Second, the court found that even if Amtrakls policy were
clearly set forth, it was unconstitutionally vague. "[Tihe term
'political' is of such unclear meaning that it is easily suscepti-
ble to arbitrary or discriminatory censorship by those adminis-
tering the policy."' The court also relied upon the fact that
Amtrak's executives were unable to offer a coherent definition
of the scope of the policy. The court concluded that "[s]uch a
vague policy provides Amtrak officials with precisely the kind
of unfettered discretion to control speech that the Supreme
Court has held to contravene the First Amendment."'
Third, the policy had not been consistently applied. Bill-
board space in Penn Station had been leased many times for
advertisements that would be "political" by one of the defini-
tions Amtrak had advanced, i.e., not related to the sale of a
product or service. The record showed that advertising space
had been leased to a number of noncommercial advertisers,
including the New York Department of the Environment, the
New York Department of Commerce, a muscular dystrophy
foundation and The Worldwide Church of God for its Plain
Truth magazine, and also had been used for public service
advertisements on such subjects as homelessness, the environ-
ment, drunk driving, AIDS awareness, health issues and race
relations.' The court also noted that the contract between
Amtrak and TDI expressly allows public service advertise-
ments as well as "political" advertisements." The guidelines
TDI used to interpret that contract accept political advertising
and treat it in the same way as commercial advertising, charg-
ing the full rate.:'
Addressing Amtrak's argument that its policy had been
consistently applied with respect to the Spectacular, the court
pointed out that Amtrak never contended that the policy ap-
plied only to the Spectacular, a finding which was the basis for
26 Lebron I, 811 F. Supp. at 1002.
27 1&L
281& at 1003.
29 d. at 1004.
30 I& at 1003.
" Lebron I, 811 F. Supp. at 1003.
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the court's consideration of Amtrak's practice with respect to
advertising throughout the station. In any event, the court
pointed out that regardless of its scope, the policy would be
void because it was unwritten and vague.32
Finally, the court held that Amtrak's policy might be void
for viewpoint bias, depending upon which of the several ver-
sions of the policy Amtrak employees had described were actu-
ally the Amtrak policy. If, as DeAngelo testified, the policy
gave Amtrak discretion to refuse advertising involving "Views
which could result in dissension or involve [Amtrak] in dissen-
sion, complaints, or controversy with its patrons or the public,"
it would be void.3 For the same reason, the court held that
the policy would be void if it were as set forth in TDI's adver-
tising guidelines, which "are designed to ensure against adver-
tising that is controversial, in bad taste, or inconsistent with
the taste and preferences of the majority of the community."'
The court concluded that "Amtrak... may not regulate speech
in an effort to shield its customers from the abrasive, the ob-
noxious, the controversial."35 Because the district court reject-
ed Amtrak's policy on grounds that applied regardless of the
nature of the forum, the court never reached the issue of
whether the Spectacular was a public forum.
F. The Second Circuit's Decisions
Amtrak appealed," and a divided court of appeals re-
versed, holding that Amtrak was a private entity not subject to
constitutional constraints. Accordingly, the court did not
32 Id. at 1004 n.12.
'3 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) ("If there is a bedrock prin-
ciple underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit
the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable."); see also FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978) ("[The
fact that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppress-
ing it.").
" Lebron 1, 811 F. Supp. at 1004.
31 Id. at 1005.
" On February 10, 1993, the district court denied Amtrak a stay pending ap-
peal, but granted it time to seek a stay from the court of appeals. The district
court recommended that the court of appeals not grant a stay, but on February
23, 1993, a court of appeals panel granted a stay and expedited the appeal.
37 Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 12 F.3d 388 (2d Cir. 1993), reu'd,
remanded, 115 S. Ct. 961 (1995).
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reach the merits of Lebrons First Amendment claim and re-
mitted the case to- state court for resolution of Lebron's con-
tract claim. In February 1994, however, the Supreme Court
reversed, holding that Amtrak is a government entity for con-
stitutional purposes." The Court remanded the case to the
Second Circuit to determine whether Amtrak had violated Leb-
ron's First Amendment rights.
After receiving supplemental letter briefs and hearing
reargument on the First Amendment issues, the Second Cir-
cuit again reversed. Rather than beginning, as the district
court did, with a review of the facial constitutionality of
Amtrak's policy, Judge Daniel Mahoney, writing for the court,
began with a public forum analysis. The panel held that the
relevant forum for First Amendment purposes was the Spec-
tacular, rather than all Penn Station advertising, because the
Spectacular was the specific advertising space to which Lebron
had sought access.39
Although the court acknowledged that Amtrak does not
maintain a written policy with respect to advertising on the
Spectacular, it found that Amtrak's "practice is clear, it has
never opened the Spectacular for anything except purely com-
mercial advertising." In light of this "undisputed practice,"
the court concluded that the Spectacular "is not a public forum;
most likely, it is a nonpublic forum, or perhaps it is a limited
public forum opened for purely commercial speech."' Accord-
ingly, Amtrak's policy against noncommercial advertisements
on the Spectacular would be upheld as long as it was view-
point-neutral and reasonable in relation to the forum's pur-
pose.'
" Lebron v. National R.. Passenger Corp., 115 S. Ct. 961 (1995).
"Lebron ll, 69 F.3d at 655, amende, rehg denied, 74 F.3d 371 (2d Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1675 (1996) ("Because of its unique size, location,
and visibility, Lebron sought access only to the Spectacular, and refused to accept
any other advertising space in New York City managed by TDL Although Lebron
now contends that we should broaden our public forum inquiry to all Penn Station
advertising space, it was he who determined that only the Spectacular would be
acceptable for his display.").
Id. at 656.
41 Id.
42 Id.
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BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
Relying upon Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights,43 in
which the Supreme Court narrowly upheld an ordinance
against political advertising inside city buses, the court held
that "Amtrak's decision, as a proprietor, to decline to enter the
political arena, even indirectly, by displaying political advertis-
ements is certainly reasonable.., to avoid the criticism and
the embarrassments of allowing any display seeming to favor
any political view."4'
The court rejected Lebron's vagueness challenge to
Amtrak's policy against "political" advertising simply by citing
the plurality opinion in Lehman, which did not even address a
vagueness argument.4" The court also asserted that the fact
that a policy "is not committed to writing does not of itself
constitute a First Amendment violation." Distinguishing City of
Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co.,4" in which the
Court struck down a newsrack licensing regulation on the
ground that it contained no written standards, the court found
that
prior written agreements [between Amtrak and its in-station adver-
tising contractor], together with the testimony of the Amtrak official
responsible for approving advertisements on the Spectacular and
Amtrak's historic practice of reserving the Spectacular for commer-
cial advertisements, dispel the notion that Amtrak enjoyed "unbri-
dled discretion" or could have perpetrated an "illegitimate abuse of
censorial power" in rejecting an advertisement because of its politi-
cal content.
47
As to the district court's finding that the policy had been
inconsistently applied, the panel held that "because the policy
against political advertisements was limited in scope to the
Spectacular, there is no evidence that Amtrak's policy has ever
been applied inconsistently."48 Because it found that Amtrak
418 U.S. 298 (1974).
" Lebron II, 69 F.3d at 658.
45 Id.
40 486 U.S. 750 (1988).
41 Lebron II, 69 F.3d at 658.
' Id. Amtrak conceded that there had been only six previous advertisers on
the Spectacular, which tended to be leased out for long-term contracts. None of
these prior advertisers had sought to display a political advertisement. Amtrak
Brief at 7 n.5, Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 69 F.3d 650 (2d Cir.),
amended, reh'g denied, 74 F.3d 371 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1676
(1996).
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applied a different policy to the rest of Penn Station advertis-
ing, the court deemed irrelevant the fact that Amtrak had
displayed political advertisements elsewhere in the station, in-
cluding the long-running advertisement for The Plain Truth
immediately in front of the Spectacular.
Finally, the court concluded that Amtral's policy was not
viewpoint-based. By confining its analysis to the Spectacular,
the panel ignored the Plain Truth advertisement, which pro-
vided the most compelling evidence of viewpoint discrimina-
tion. The court also rejected the district court's finding that the
policy might be viewpoint-based on its face, noting that the
lower court's concern with viewpoint discrimination was based
upon Amtrak's 1980 agreement with TDI and a 1967 agree-
ment between TDI and the former Penn Station owner, Penn-
sylvania Railroad. The 1967 agreement gave Amtrak the dis-
cretion to refuse any advertising that "involve[s] political or
other views which could result in dissension or involve [Am-
trak] in dissension, complaints or controversy with its patrons
or the public." 9 While conceding that "if such a policy were
used to screen out only controversial political advertisements,"
it would be void for viewpoint bias, the panel reasoned that "it
seems more sensible to read the language as a justification,
however inartfully phrased, for a categorical ban against politi-
cal advertising."'
Nor was the court persuaded by Lebron's additional argu-
ment that Amtrak had engaged in viewpoint discrimination by
excluding his message not to buy Coors beer for political rea-
sons even though an actual Coors beer advertisement would
have been permitted. Avoiding the issue, the panel noted sim-
ply that Lebron's advertisement did not address the "merits or
demerits of Coors beer," although it did not explain the signifi-
cance of this observation."'
"Lebron I, 69 F.3d at 658 (citing Lebron 1, 811 F. Supp at 1001-02) (quoting
TDI licensing agreement (alterations added)).
so Id
11 Id at 659 n.4. Finally, the panel concluded that [blecause we have found
that Amtrak£s policy against political advertisements was limited in scope to the
Spectacular," Lebron lacked standing to maintain a facial challenge to Amtrak's
advertising policy as applied in other parts of Penn Station because that policy
was "not at issue" in this case. Lebron lacked standing to maintain a facial chal-
lenge to Amtrak's advertising policy as applied in other parts of Penn Station. In
reaching this conclusion, the panel reasoned that the more liberal standing re-
19961
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Chief Judge Jon 0. Newman dissented. First, he took
issue with the majority's narrow focus on the Spectacular as
the forum. He maintained that under the majority's approach,
Amtrak could deny use of the Spectacular for Republican Party
advertising even if it had permitted the Democratic Party to
advertise on one of the dioramas flanking the Spectacular. 2
In Chief Judge Newman's view, "The relevant forum must be
at least the advertising space in the rotunda of Penn Sta-
tion-the means of communication to which Lebron sought ac-
cess."53 Once the forum is properly defined, Chief Judge
Newman maintained, "Amtrak's violation of the First Amend-
ment is evident because it has leased advertising space on a
kiosk in the rotunda for The Plain Truth, a magazine the
Court acknowledges is devoted to 'political and social is-
sues.
,
m
54
Chief Judge Newman also criticized the majority's conclu-
sion that Amtrak's policy was not vague simply because Am-
trak previously had not permitted any political advertisements
on the Spectacular:
[Wihere a policy is unwritten, unclear, and undisseminated, the fact
that it has not yet been used discriminatorily does not save it from
invalidation under the First Amendment. The vice of conferring dis-
cretion on government officials to determine which messages may be
conveyed is not avoided by their past pattern of not making a dis-
criminatory decision. The vice inheres in the opportunity for dis-
crimination .. ..
Lebron sought rehearing, pointing out that the finding on
which every one of the panel's legal conclusions was grounded
conflicted with the district court's finding (and Amtrak's stipu-
lation) that Amtrak's advertising policy applied to all advertis-
quirements of the overbreadth doctrine in the First Amendment context were inap-
posite because that doctrine "has only been applied to the conduct of the govern-
ment in its role as a regulator, not as a proprietor." Id. at 659.
2 Id. at 661 (Newman, C.J., dissenting).
8Id.
5 Lebron I1, 69 F.3d at 661.
" Id. at 662. While he found it unnecessary to reach the question given the
policy's other constitutional infirmities, Chief Judge Newman also observed that
Amtrak's policy may constitute viewpoint discrimination because it allows adver-
tisements promoting the sale of beer for commercial reasons, but bars an adver-
tisement opposing the purchase of the same product for political reasons. Id. at
662-63.
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ing in Penn Station and not just to the Spectacular. In re-
sponse, the panel denied rehearing and issued an amended
opinion in which it simply deleted the sentences that had ex-
pressly referred to its finding of a Spectacular-specific policy.'
It made no substantive change to its legal analysis or conclu-
sions.
Dissenting from the denial of rehearing, Chief Judge
Newman noted that the deletions from the court's decision
"leave the Court's legal analysis... even more vulnerable than
I thought it was in my original opinion. ' Chief Judge
Newman observed that the principal legal conclusions in the
court's revised opinion lacked a factual foundation, stating that
[tihe revised recognition that Amtraks policy, whatever its content,
is not limited in scope to the Spectacular leaves unsupported the
majority's view that the policy has not been applied inconsistently.
In fact, as the district court found, advertisements falling within a
broad category of political messages had been displayed in Penn
Station. The majority has concluded that the policy has been consis-
tently applied by overlooking the instances where it has not been
consistently applied.'
Moreover, Chief Judge Newman maintained:
[N]o matter what the scope of the forum, a governmental entity vio-
lates the First Amendment when it bars display of political messag-
es pursuant to a "policy" that has been found by a fact-finder, with
abundant evidentiary support, to be vague, unwritten,
undisseminated, unclear to those who administer it, and inconsis-
tently applied.59
II. ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION
The following analysis of the court of appeals' ruling be-
gins with a discussion of the scope of Amtrak's policy, a factual
matter as to which the court of appeals, in Lebron ii, disagreed
with the district court and which served as the framework for
the court of appeals' analysis of the case. The Article then
discusses Lebron's facial challenge to Amtrak's asserted policy,
Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 74 F.3d 371 (2d Cir. 1995) [herein-
after Lebron LL].
Id. at 372 (Newman, C.J., dissenting).
TM Id. at 371.
Id. at 372-73.
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which the district court found to be an independently sufficient
basis for ruling in Lebron's favor. The Article then looks at the
court of appeals' public forum analysis, which comprised the
conceptual foundation for its disposition of the case.
A. The Scope of Amtrak's Policy
As Chief Judge Newman recognized, a fundamental flaw
in the panel's decision was its inexplicable deviation from the
district court's unchallenged factual finding that the same
policy against political advertising applied throughout Penn
Station.' ° Indeed, Amtrak had admitted the following pro-
posed finding of fact:
According to Anthony DeAngelo, Amtrak Vice President for Real Es-
tate and Operations Development, Amtrak applies the same adver-
tising standards to the Spectacular as it does to all other advertis-
ing, including in-station advertising (wall posters, dioramas, free-
standing 'island' or kiosks) and billboards along Amtrak's right of
way.
6 1
Amtrak never challenged as clearly erroneous the district
court's finding that one substantive policy applied throughout
the station.62 In fact, Amtrak asserted on appeal that its poli-
cy "applies to all advertising in Amtrak's facilities."' Accord-
ingly, Amtrak waived the right to challenge that finding, and
the court of appeals had no authority to set aside, nor any
factual basis for setting aside, the district court's finding and
substitute its own finding that the policy was limited to the
Spectacular.'
' The district court noted that "[tihe Amtrak policy identified by Mr. DeAngelo
as the reason for the rejection is its prohibition of 'political' advertisements in
Penn Station." Lebron I, 811 F. Supp. at 1001 (emphasis added).
6" Supplementary Exhibit Volume at SE2384, Lebron v. National R.R. Passen-
ger Corp., 69 F.3d 650 (2d Cir.), amended, reh'g denied, 74 F.3d 371 (2d Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1675 (1996).
6 According to Amtrak, the only difference between the treatment of the Spec-
tacular and other advertising space is procedural: With other advertising spaces,
Amtrak applies its policy against "political" advertising after the advertisements
have gone up, whereas with the Spectacular, advertisements are pre-screened for
conformity with the policy. Prior to Lebron's case, however, no advertisement in
Penn Station had ever been found to violate the policy.
' Amtrak Brief at 7, Lebron v. National R.R. Corp., 69 F.3d 650 (2d Cir.
1995).
" See FED. R. CIv. P. 52(a) (trial court's factual findings "shall not be set
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Once Lebron forced the court of appeals to acknowledge
that it had misconstrued the scope of Amtraks policy and that
the same policy applied throughout the station, the conceptual
underpinning of the entire decision collapsed, and the violation
of Lebron's First Amendment rights was patent. By deleting
from its opinion all references to the policy being limited to the
Spectacular without altering any of the conclusions that had
been premised upon that finding, the Second Circuit's opinion,
as amended, contains the following conclusions:
(1) Amtrak's unwritten policy does not present a danger of
unbridled discretion in regulating speech notwithstanding
record evidence of numerous noncommercial/political advertise-
ments in Penn Station-including an advertisement for a free
conservative religious magazine on a kiosk immediately in
front of the Spectacular-that were permitted under the same
policy invoked to reject Lebron's advertisement;
(2) Amtrak's policy has been consistently applied, notwith-
standing record evidence of other noncommercial/political ad-
vertising in Penn Station permitted under the same policy;
(3) Amtrak's refusal to display Lebron's politically liberal,
noncommercial advertisement urging viewers not to buy Coors
beer was not viewpoint-based, notwithstanding the contempo-
raneous display of an advertisement for the politically conser-
vative, noncommercial publication The Plain Truth.'
A close analysis of the opinion reveals a court seemingly
more intent on justifying the suppression of controversial
speech than with enforcing First Amendment and due process
limitations on government regulation of speech in one of New
York's most prominent public venues.
aside unless clearly erroneous"); Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.. 564, 673-74
(1985); Apex Oil Co. v. Vanguard Oil and Serv. Co., 760 F.2d 417, 422 (2d Cir.
1985) (district courts factual findings may not be disturbed unless appellant car-
ries "heavy burden" of showing that they are clearly erroneous).
The court originally held that since Amtrak policy only applied to the Spec-
tacular, Lebron lacked standing to bring a facial challenge to Aratralis advertising
policy for the station as a whole. Lebron II, 69 F.3d at 659-60. In effect, the court
held that Lebron could not challenge the constitutionality of the very policy in-
voked to deny him his right to speak. This aspect of the decision was rendered
insupportable by the court's concession in its revised opinion that Amtraks policy
applies throughout Penn Station, although the court failed to acknowledge this in
Lebron IMI. The standing issue will not be further discussed in this Article, which
focuses on the substantive First Amendment issues in the case.
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B. The Constitutionality of Amtrak's Policy
The district court found Amtrak's policy unconstitutional
without regard to the nature of the forum. Diverging sharply
from the district court, the court of appeals began its opinion
with a review of the public forum doctrine. The court of ap-
peals appears to have followed previous Supreme Court cas-
es66 in which public forum analysis was a threshold inqui-
ry." None of those cases, however, involved a facial challenge,
such as Lebron's, to the policy at issue that would have pro-
vided a basis for deciding the case without reaching the public
forum issue.6"
The panel's failure to begin its analysis with an examina-
tion of the facial validity of Amtrak's policy indicates its insuf-
ficient sensitivity to the First Amendment rights at stake. Par-
ticularly where free speech rights are implicated,69 due pro-
cess requires that the regulations be sufficiently precise to
safeguard against the discriminatory suppression of constitu-
tionally protected speech.7" As the district court and Chief
Judge Newman recognized, forum analysis is irrelevant if a
regulation of speech is unwritten, impermissibly vague, incon-
' See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672
(1992); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788
(1985); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983);
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
"' In Cornelius, the Court stated: "To determine whether the First Amendment
permits the Government to exclude respondents . .. we must first decide whether
the forum consists of the federal workplace, as petitioner contends, or the Com-
bined Federal Campaign, as respondents maintain. Having defined the relevant
forum, we must then determine whether it is public or nonpublic in nature." 473
U.S. at 800; see infra notes 127-128 and accompanying text.
Lebron challenged Amtrak's policy both on its face and as applied to him.
63 Political speech, such as Lebron's, traditionally has been accorded the highest
level of First Amendment protection. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318 (1988);
see also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (First Amend-
ment reflects a "profound national commitment" to the principle that "debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open").
"' See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972).
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sistently applied and possibly viewpoint-based." Indeed, the
vagueness doctrine applies even where no forum whatsoever is
involved.72
1. Amtrak's Unwritten Policy
The district court recognized that the unwritten nature of
Amtrak's policy implicated the constitutional proscription
against placing unfettered discretion to regulate speech in the
hands of government officials. 73 The court noted that a licens-
ing scheme devoid of explicit standards "constitutes a prior
restraint and may result in censorship."
7 4
"1 Lebron I, 811 F. Supp. at 1004 n.12; Lebron II, 69 F.3d at 662 (Newman,
C.J., dissenting). In Board of Airport Comm'rs of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus,
Inc., 482 U.S. 573-75 (1987), the Court held that it did not need to determine
whether an airport was a public forum or a nonpublic forum because the ordi-
nance challenged-which prohibited all 'First Amendment activities" in the air-
port-was overbroad and therefore unconstitutional regardless of the forum. The
Court also declined to adopt a narrowing construction on the ground that doing so
would have rendered the statute unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 576; sce Perry
Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 57 (1983) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("n focusing on the public forum issue, the Court disregards the First
Amendments central prescription against censorship, in the form of viewpoint dis-
crimination, in any forum, public or nonpublic."); AIDS Action Comm. v. Massachu-
setts Bay Transp. Auth., 42 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1994) (challenged transportation
advertising policy prohibiting messages or representations 'pertaining to sexual
conduct" was vague and broad, thus making it unnecessary to divine the nature of
the forum to invalidate the policy).
' See, e.g., Bullfrog Films v. Wick, 847 F.2d 502, 512-14 (9th Cir. 1988) (hold-
ing unconstitutionally vague federal regulations that governed distribution of bene-
fits to documentary films); Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States, 631 F.2d 1030,
1035-40 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding unconstitutionally vague IRS criteria for granting
tax exemptions to non-profit educational groups); Gay Men's Health Crisis v.
Sullivan, 792 F. Supp. 278, 295-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding unconstitutionally
vague grant guideline for AIDS educational materials).
Lebron 1, 811 F. Supp. at 1001, 1003.
' Id; see FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 225-26 (1990); Staub v.
City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 322 (1958); Saia v. New York, 334 US. 560-62
(1948) (ban on use of sound amplification devices without permission of chief of
police unconstitutional prior restraint where no standards prescribed for exercise of
discretion); see also Abel v. Town of Orangetown, 759 F. Supp. 161, 164-65
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (striking down zoning ordinance allowing town board unfettered
discretion in granting consent to place sign on town property); New Alliance Party
v. Dinkns, 743 F. Supp. 1055, 1064-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (invalidating parks special
events permit system lacking any regulatory guidelines).
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In City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 7 up-
on which the district court relied, the Supreme Court consid-
ered a facial challenge by a daily newspaper to an ordinance
vesting the mayor with absolute' discretion to grant or deny
applications for annual newsrack permits. The Court began by
identifying the dangers of standardless licensing schemes that
justified permitting a facial challenge. First, the Court noted
that "the mere existence of the licensor's unfettered discretion,
coupled with the power of prior restraint, intimidates parties
into censoring their own speech, even if the discretion and
power are never actually abused."76
Second, the Court explained that the "absence of express
standards makes it difficult to distinguish... between a
licensor's legitimate denial of a permit and its illegitimate
abuse of censorial power." 7 The Court noted that without
standards,
post hoc rationalizations by the licensing official and the use of shift-
ing or illegitimate criteria are far too easy, making it difficult for
courts to determine in any particular case whether the licensor is
permitting favorable, and suppressing unfavorable, expression."
In City of Lakewood, the city asked the Court to presume
that the mayor would act in good faith and deny permit appli-
cations only for reasons relating to the health, safety or wel-
fare of the citizens, and that additional terms would only be
imposed for similar reasons.79 The Court, however, rejected
the city's reliance upon "the very presumption that the doc-
trine forbidding unbridled discretion disallows.""
In Lebron, Amtrak attempted to establish a written source
for its policy by pointing to the superseded 1967 and 1980
agreements with TDI that permitted Amtrak to refuse any ad-
vertising that Amtrak deemed to involve, inter alia, "political
or other views which could result in dissension or involve [Am-
trak] in dissension, complaints or controversy with its patrons
or the public .... ."' However, the 1991 contract in effect
76 486 U.S. 750 (1988).
76 Id. at 757.
" Id. at 758.
78 Id. at 758.
79 Id. at 770.
City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 770.
'x Lebron I, 811 F. Supp. at 1001-02.
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when Lebron contracted with TDI gave Amtrak the right to
disapprove any advertising "at its own discretion"-a standard
no less unbounded than that struck down in City of Lakewood.
As the district court noted, citing City of Lakewood, "An un-
written censorship policy is susceptible to inconsistent applica-
tion that threatens free speech."' The district court further
found that neither Delaney nor any TDI executive, including
the agent who had negotiated the contract with Lebron, had
ever heard of a policy against "political" advertising.'
The absence of written standards does not, in itself, neces-
sarily render a licensing scheme unconstitutional. As the Su-
preme Court noted in City of Lakewood, standards not explicit-
ly incorporated into a written regulation must "be made explic-
it by textual incorporation, binding judicial or administrative
construction, or well-established practice."' For the Second
Circuit majority, the consistent, albeit limited, practice of re-
serving the Spectacular for commercial advertisements, cou-
pled with the superseded prior written agreements and
DeAngelo's testimony of Amtrak's "historic practice" of reserv-
ing the Spectacular for commercial advertising, "dispell[ed] the
notion that Amtrak enjoyed 'unbridled discretion' or could have
perpetrated an 'illegitimate abuse of censorial power' in reject-
ing an advertisement because of its political content.""
There are several problems with this reasoning. First,
there had been only six previous advertisers on the Spectacu-
lar, which tends to be leased under long-term contracts, and
none of those advertisers had sought to display a noncommer-
cial/political advertisement.' Thus, Amtrak's asserted policy
2Id. at 1001.
8 Id. at 1002.
"486 U.S. at 770 (emphasis added); cf U.S. Southwest Afica/Namibia Trade
& Cultural Council v. United States, 708 F.2d 760, 762 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("Al-
though the contract [between the FAA and TDI] does not, by its terms, prohibit
political advertisements, it consistently has been applied by the MWA to prohibit
ads which would be considered political or issue-oriented in nature, rather than
commercial or public service.") (internal quotes omitted).
Lebron H, 69 F.3d at 658.
"The court of appeals pointed out that 'in the twenty-six years of its exis-
tence, the Spectacular has never been used for any type of advertising other than
commercial promotions. The only advertisements that have appeared on the Spec-
tacular have promoted the DuPont Company, Resorts International in Atlantic
City, the Broadway play 'Sophisticated Ladies,' Fujitsu Computers, Nike athletic
wear, and A & S Department Stores. Id. at 654.
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with respect to the Spectacular had never been tested previ-
ously. In fact, as already noted, not only the parameters of that
policy but also its very existence was, at best, less than clear to
those responsible for administering the leasing of the Spectacu-
lar or Amtrak station advertising in general.
Second, since Amtrak conceded that the same substantive
advertising policy applied throughout Penn Station (the only
difference being prior review by Amtrak of proposed advertise-
ments for the Spectacular), the relevant "well established prac-
tice" should have been the practice throughout Penn Station,
not merely that with respect to the Spectacular. Thus, the
Plain Truth advertisement, advertisements by non-profit orga-
nizations and the public service advertisements of which there
was record evidence all properly should have been factored into
the panel's analysis. But the court relied upon the unique size
and prominence of the Spectacular, which were key reasons for
Lebron's insistence upon the Spectacular over any other loca-
tion in Manhattan, as a basis for ignoring Amtrak's practice
with respect to the rest of the station.
Only by artificially truncating the relevant scope of
Amtrak's practice, and by giving undue weight to the extreme-
ly limited body of Spectacular advertising, was the court able
to sustain Amtrak's unwritten policy. Apparently satisfied by
DeAngelo's assertion that noncommercial advertising would
never be permitted on the Spectacular, the court expressed no
concern over Chief Judge Newman's observation that the "vice
of conferring unfettered discretion on government officials to
determine which messages may be conveyed is not avoided by
their past pattern of not making a discriminatory decision. The
vice inheres in the opportunity for discrimination ..... 87 In
effect, the court ignored City of Lakewood and relied upon "the
very presumption that the doctrine forbidding unbridled discre-
tion disallows."'
Once the court corrected its erroneous assumption that the
policy applied to the Spectacular only, 9 it nevertheless left
unaltered its conclusion that Amtrak's clear practice as to the
Spectacular neutralized any concern with arbitrary en-
87 Id. at 662 (Newman, C.J., dissenting).
City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 770.
Lebron III, 74 F.3d at 371.
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forcement-a concern that would appear to have been amply
justified by the acceptance of the Plain Truth advertisement
and the rejection of Lebron's. In short, even once the basis
upon which the panel distinguished City of Lake-
wood-consistent past practice-disappeared, the panel upheld
Amtraks apparently arbitrary refusal to display Lebron's ad-
vertisement.
2. Vagueness
Even if the unwritten nature of Amtrakls asserted policy
against "political" advertising were not sufficient to render it
invalid, the district court held that it was unconstitutionally
vague."0 It is diicult to fathom how the court of appeals
found otherwise.
It is a fundamental requirement of due process that regu-
lations of speech must be clearly delineated. The due process
doctrine of vagueness-applicable to both criminal and non-
criminal regulations-incorporates two basic principles. First,
the regulation must "give the person of ordinary intelligence a
reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he
may act accordingly."9' Second, the regulation must provide
explicit standards for those charged with its enforcement to
prevent discriminatory application.' These interests are
served by regulations that contain terms "susceptible of objec-
tive measurement."
The Supreme Court repeatedly has emphasized that the
vagueness doctrine applies with particular force in relation to
regulations of constitutionally protected speech. In Smith v.
Goguen, the Court stated that where a statute "is capable of
reaching expression sheltered by the First Amendment, the
Lebron I, 811 F. Supp. at 1002-03.
" Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572 (1974); Grayned v. City of Reckford, 408
U.S. 104, 108 (1972); Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 287
(1961); Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) ([A] statute
which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application violates the first essential of due process of law.").
'2 Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108.
"Cramp, 368 U.S. at 286-87 (striking down oath requiring state employees to
swear they had never lent "aid, support, advice, counsel or influence to the Com-
munist Party").
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[vagueness] doctrine demands a greater degree of specificity
than in other contexts."' Thus, where First Amendment in-
terests are at stake, the Court has emphasized that "precision
of drafting and clarity of purpose are essential."95
Speech regulations which are not committed to writing
present the greatest possible threat to the policies served by
the vagueness doctrine. Such undisclosed standards fail to
provide notice of what is prohibited, invite arbitrary enforce-
ment and chill protected speech. Vague standards likewise fail
to safeguard free speech rights and pose a threat of prior re-
straint." In Lebron's case, the threat of arbitrary enforcement
was clear. Likewise, particularly in view of the expense in-
volved in Lebron's chosen form of expression, the uncertainty
flowing from the arbitrary application of the vague guidelines
very well might chill the initiative to undertake other projects
dealing with controversial subject matter.
Amtrak rejected Lebron's advertisement on the basis of a
never-before-asserted policy against "political" advertising. The
district court found that policy to be "of such unclear meaning
that it is easily susceptible to arbitrary or discriminatory cen-
sorship by those administering the policy."97 But the court of
94 415 U.S. at 573; see Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates,
Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982) ("If... the law interferes with the right of free
speech or of association, a more stringent vagueness test should apply.");
Keyishian v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of New York, 385 U.S. 589, 603-04
(1967) ("Because First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, gov-
ernment may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity.") (quoting NAACP
v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432-33 (1963)); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151
(1959) ("[Sltricter standards of permissible statutory vagueness may be applied to
a statute having a potentially inhibiting effect on speech; a man may the less be
required to act at his peril here, because the free dissemination of ideas may be
the loser.").
" Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 217-18 (1975); see Button,
371 U.S. at 438 ("Precision of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so
closely touching our most precious freedoms.").
" See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1969)
(overturning conviction for violating ordinance giving city commission authority to
deny permit for public parade or demonstration if "in its judgment the public
welfare, peace, safety, health, decency, good order, morals or convenience" require
that it be refused); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 688
(1968) (same regarding standard of "not suitable for young persons"); Commercial
Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 346 U.S. 587 (1954) (same regarding "immoral" and
"tend to corrupt morals"); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 496 (1952)
("sacrilegious" an unconstitutionally vague film licensing standard).
' Lebron I, 811 F. Supp. at 1002.
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appeals held, without further discussion: "Nor would a policy
against 'political' advertising on the Spdctacular be void for
vagueness in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Lehman
"98
In Lehman, the Court considered a challenge by a candi-
date for state office to a policy, embodied in the contract be-
tween the City of Shaker Heights and its advertising contrac-
tor, that prohibited "political" advertising in car cards on the
city's public transit system. There was uncontradicted evidence
at trial that during the twenty-six years of its operation, the
Shaker Heights public transportation system had not accepted
or permitted any "political or public issue advertising on its
vehicles.' 9 The system had accepted advertisements from
churches and civic and public-service oriented groups (which
presumably did not address public issues)."° The advertising
contractor informed Lehman that although advertising space
was available, its agreement with the city did not allow it to
accept political advertising. The Supreme Court of Ohio reject-
ed Lehman's contention that the rejection of his advertisement
violated his First Amendment speech and Fourteenth Amend-
ment equal protection rights, holding that Lehman's free
speech rights did not extend to rapid transit vehicles and that
there was no equal protection violation because all candidates
for public office were treated alike.1"' Lehman never contend-
ed that the policy was void for vagueness.
The only issues before the Supreme Court in Lehman were
whether the car cards constituted a public forum and, if they
were not, whether the city's policy was reasonable. In his plu-
rality opinion, Justice Blackmun distinguished the car card
spaces from traditional public fora such as parks, street cor-
ners, open spaces and other public thoroughfares. Terming the
city's management of the car card space in the public transpor-
tation system "part of a commercial venture,"" the plurality
concluded that just as a newspaper, periodical, radio or televi-
sion station need not accept all proposed advertisements, a city
' Lebron H, 69 F.3d at 658 (citing Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418
U.S. 298, 303-04 (1974)).
Lehman, 418 U.S. at 300-01.0 Id- at 300.
'01 Id. at 301.
1 2 Id. at 303.
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transit system "has discretion to develop and make reasonable
choices concerning the type of advertising that may be dis-
played in its vehicles."'0 ' The plurality went on to conclude:
No First Amendment forum is here to be found. The city consciously
has limited access to its transit system advertising space in order to
minimize chances of abuse, the appearance of favoritism, and the
risk of imposing upon a captive audience. These are reasonable leg-
islative objectives advanced by the city in a proprietary
capacity.1°4
It is clear that in Lehman, the Supreme Court did not confront
a vagueness challenge to the city's policy. Lehman therefore
lacks the precedential value ascribed to it by the Second Cir-
cuit in Lebron.
Moreover, there are critical factual differences between
Lehman and Lebron. Amtrak's unwritten "policy" is far more
open-ended and ambiguous than the written policy at issue in
Lehman. In Lehman, the city drew a sharp distinction between
advertisements by "purveyors of goods and services saleable in
commerce," and other advertisements, namely political or pub-
lic issue advertisements." 5 Amtrak's asserted policy, by con-
trast, does not distinguish between commercial advertisements
and political or public issue advertisements. In practice, Am-
trak allows some noncommercial political advertisements, such
as those for The Plain Truth, and prohibits others.' Thus,
Amtrak's policy does not draw the commercial/noncommercial
line upheld in Lehman.'°7
10 Id.
Lehman, 418 U.S. at 304.
10 Id. at 300, 303-04.
10 See Lebron I, 811 F. Supp. at 1004.
10? Amtrak also suggested that its policy was not vague because Lebron's adver-
tisement was clearly political, and therefore as applied to him the policy was not
vague. But "political" and "objectionable" are such vague terms that one can never
know whether any particular expression will fall within their ambit. Indeed,
Amtrak's own employees were divided and uncertain about whether Lebron's ad-
vertisement was political. Delaney testified that he understood "political" to cover
only campaign advertisements, and thus he would not find Lebron's advertisement
political. There is no doubt that some would find Lebron's advertisement political
and/or objectionable, but there is equally no doubt that some would find any ad-
vertisement Amtrak has ever displayed political and/or objectionable. The current
Spectacular advertisement for Bloomberg Radio, for example, proclaims "All The
News You Need To Know," a statement fraught with political judgment as to what
information merits dissemination.
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Elsewhere in its opinion, the court of appeals adopted
Amtrak's post hoc characterization of its policy with respect to
the Spectacular as "excluding noncommercial advertisements
from the Spectacular. ""' Such a policy would not be as vul-
nerable to a claim of vagueness as would a policy against "po-
litical" advertising. This undoubtedly was why Amtrak charac-
terized its policy in that manner during the litigation and why
the court, apparently intent upon upholding Amtrakls action,
accepted that characterization. The court may have assumed
that, in informing Lebron that it had a policy against "politi-
cal" advertising, Amtrak was characterizing its policy against
noncommercial advertising in a manner tailored to Lebron's
indisputably political advertisement. But that assumption is
problematic for several reasons.
First, the district court properly reviewed the policy assert-
ed to deny Lebron the right to display his advertisement: a
policy against "political" advertising." Instead of accepting
Amtrak's post hoc characterization, the court of appeals prop-
erly should have reviewed the policy as asserted (and as un-
derstood by the district court), rather than allowing Amtrak to
benefit from the unwritten nature of the policy by redefining it
once litigation had commenced.
Second, as the district court observed, the terms "political"
and "noncommercial" generally are not regarded as synony-
mous:
Amtrak contends that the term 'political" as employed in its policy
means to include (and therefore prohibit) all advertisements that do
not seek to sell a product or service. However, that is certainly not
what the term "political" is generally understood to mean, and, as
noted, this is not how the relevant personnel understand the policy.
When a standard for governmental control of speech is so unclear,
there is a high likelihood of inconsistent and discriminatory applica-
tion. Such a vague policy provides Amtrak officials with precisely
the kind of unfettered discretion to control speech that the Supreme
Court has held to contravene the First Amendment."'
The notion that "political" can be equated with "noncom-
mercial" was belied by Amtraks own witnesses. Both Bourque
and DeAngelo testified that an indisputably commercial
'o' Lebron 1I, 69 F.3d at 656.
' Lebron I, 811 F. Supp. at 1002-03.
no Id. at 1003.
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advertisement for Time magazine discussing the magazine's
coverage of the fall of Mikhail Gorbachev would be barred for
its "political" content. When shown several advertisements for
Benetton, a clothing manufacturer, Bourque testified that they
contained political messages. The trouble Bourque and
DeAngelo had in articulating the contours of Amtrak's policy in
relation to certain undeniably commercial advertisements
demonstrates the amorphous nature of the term "political" and
the difficulty of neatly distinguishing between "political" and
"commercial.""' In fact, the two categories frequently over-
lap."2
Justice Brennan highlighted the uncertainty of the distinc-
tion between commercial and ideological speech in his concur-
rence in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, stating: "May
the city decide that a United Automobile Workers Billboard
with the message 'Be a patriot-do not buy Japanese-manufac-
tured cars' is 'commercial' and therefore forbid it? What if the
same sign is placed by Chrysler?" 1 3
Finally, Amtrak's contention that its policy barred all
noncommercial advertisements was belied by its display of the
noncommercial Plain Truth advertisement, as well as the pub-
... See U.S. Southwest Africa/Namibia Trade & Cultural Council v. United
States, 708 F.2d 760, 769 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("[T]he capacity of commercial speech to
communicate simultaneously political and social messages can be discerned by
anyone who gives second thought to a 'public relations' advertisement by an indus-
trial manufacturer of defense-related equipment or an advertisement for commer-
cial abortion services available at a family planning clinic.").
" Indeed, Lebron argued that the advertisement for Levi's jeans that was fea-
tured on the Spectacular when the Second Circuit heard his appeal for the first
time "contains political messages about sexuality, commercialism, and objectifica-
tion of the human body, to name just a few." Lebron Brief at 36, Lebron I, 69
F.3d 650 (2d Cir. 1995). That Lebron, an artist steeped in semiotic theory, would
see a Levi's advertisement as political whereas other viewers would not perceive
such political connotations in the same advertisement demonstrates the vagueness
of the term "political" if left undefined.
1 453 U.S. 490, 539 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan pointed
out that the constitutional concern is not so much with the definitional difficulty
of distinguishing commercial from noncommercial speech, but the danger of view-
point censorship posed by vesting the discretion for drawing that distinction in
government officials. Id. at 538-39 (Brennan, J., concurring). As noted earlier, the
uncertainty in this area is where the vagueness and the viewpoint discrimination
problems converge: The vagueness of the categories of permitted and excluded
speech creates the opportunity for viewpoint discrimination, as Lebron's experience
vividly illustrates.
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lic service and nonprofit advertisements that had been dis-
played in the station without having been removed by Amtrak.
Other courts also have noted that "political" is a term
fraught with ambiguity and uncertainty. In Air Line Pilots
Association International v. Department of Aviation of Chicago,
the Seventh Circuit noted that "the content of the word
'political' is not immediately obvious ... [and] is not self-defin-
ing."" In a concurring opinion, Judge Flaum explained that
"independent of any forum analysis, we should be most cau-
tious wherever a state actor undertakes to restrict political
speech,"" because
the very terms "political or nonpartisan" are themselves insuscepti-
ble of principled application. Far too frequently the mantle of
nonpartisanship is thrown over the shoulders of those who have
been successful in obtaining political and economic power in our
society, while the pejorative of "political" is reserved for those who
have been less successful in those same endeavors. More obliquely
(although no less perniciously), the appellation of nonpartisan is
often affixed to ideas and values whose very emptiness of political
content may itself be considered an expression of political position.
What is 'political" and what is "nonpartisan" must of necessity--as
must beauty-lie in the eyes of the beholder. For that very reason,
the Constitution will not allow such determinations to be made by
government officials.
1 6
114 45 F.3d 1144, 1154 n.7 (7th Cir. 1995).
1 Id& at 1162 (Flaum, J. concurring).
116 Id. (Flaum, J., concurring) (quoting Lawrence Univ. Bicentennial Comm'n v.
City of Appleton, 409 F. Supp. 1319, 1325 (E.D. Wis. 1976)); see Beshear v. Butt,
863 F. Supp. 913, 917-18 (E.D. Ark. 1994) (holding impermissibly vague a provi-
sion of the state's Code of Judicial Conduct prohibiting judicial candidates from
announcing their views "on legal or political issues=); Ruff v. City of Leavenworth,
858 F. Supp. 1546, 1558 (D. Kan. 1994) (striking down as vague and overbroad a
ban on city employees engaging in 'political activity" because "[clity employees are
left to speculate as to what conduct their employer might consider 'political').
Other cases in which regulations of undefined categories of speech have been
struck down on vagueness grounds include the following. Keyishian v. Board of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 598 (1967) ("treasonable and 'seditious," if undefined, are
"dangerously uncertain"); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Vilson, 343 US. 495, 504-05
(1952) ("sacrilegious" an unconstitutionally vague film licensing standard); Bulifro-
Films, Inc. v. Wick, 847 F.2d 502, 513 (9th Cir. 1988) ("appear to have as their
purpose or effect to attack or discredit economic, religious, or political views or
practices" unconstitutionally vague standard for evaluating films); Association of
Community Orgs. for Reform Now v. Golden, 744 F.2d 739, 741, 744 (10th Cir.
1984) (ordinance prohibiting door-to-door peddling and solicitation with exemption
for "charitable, religious, patriotic or philanthropic purpose" does not sufficiently
guide city council); Hall v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs of Mobile County, 681 F.2d 965,
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The most compelling basis for the district court's finding
that Amtrak's policy was unconstitutionally vague was the
confusion of Amtrak's officials over what the policy meant. The
court found that
Amtrak's executives were themselves at odds over the meaning of
Amtrak's policy. Mr. DeAngelo at times indicated that the policy
prohibited only those advertisements that were both "political" and
divisive or objectionable; at other times, he stated that the policy
prohibited all advertisements that were not devoted to the selling of
a product or service. Bruce M. Bourque, Amtrak's Project Director
for Real Estate Development for Penn Station, who first reviews
advertising material submitted for the Spectacular, knew that there
was a policy barring "political" advertisements, but he could not
really say what such a policy meant."7
DeAngelo at one point defined "political" as "mostly noncom-
mercial," but at still another point he stated that noncommer-
cial advertisements are only "potentially" political.118 He
could not say whether a Benetton advertisement that promoted
a product while expressing a political message would be con-
sidered political."9 Thus, according to Amtrak's own officials,
the noncommercial character of an advertisement apparently is
neither necessary nor sufficient to render an advertisement
"political," and what makes an advertisement either "objection-
able" or "political" is unclear.20
The district court, unlike the appellate panel, readily saw
the multiplicity of meanings that can attach to the term "politi-
cal":
968-69 (5th Cir. 1982) (school board policy giving administrator prior approval over
distribution of literature that is "political or sectarian in nature" held unconstitu-
tionally vague); Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States, 631 F.2d 1030, 1036-37
(D.C. Cir. 1980) ("advocates a particular position," equated with "controversial,"
unconstitutionally vague standard in IRS regulation).
.17 Lebron I, 811 F. Supp. at 1002.
18 Record on Appeal at A354, Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 69 F.3d
650 (2d Cir. 1995).
.. Record on Appeal at A353, Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 69 F.3d
650.
120 At oral argument, counsel for Amtrak urged the panel not to rely upon some
"bad answers" that Amtrak's witnesses had given during their depositions, and the
panel apparently complied. Surely, though, inconsistent responses by those charged
with enforcing an advertising policy as to the content of the policy and how it
would be applied to a series of specific advertisements is persuasive evidence of
Amtrak's failure to define the policy adequately.
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The policy might be thought, for example, to bar only adver-
tisements relative to candidates for political office. It might be
thought to encompass public service messages on public issues, in-
cluding drunk driving, safe sex, abortion counselling, and religious
messages. It might also cover commercial advertising that included
public service messages like "Keep America Beautiful," or that dis-
cussed controversial issues."
The undisputed record evidence of Amtrak's confusion and
inconsistency in attempting to define its advertising policy
provided a clear illustration to the district court of the inherent
vagueness of the term "political." Yet the panel majority, with-
out even addressing the basis in the record for the district
court's vagueness holding, was content to brush aside a virtual
textbook example of vagueness with a citation to Lehman, in
which the issue was never even considered.
Such striking insensitivity to one of the most significant
safeguards against the discriminatory restriction of
speech-the vagueness doctrine-is one of the most disturbing
aspects of Lebron.
C. Public Forum Analysis
Instead of first engaging in the facial analysis discussed
above, the court of appeals treated forum analysis as the prop-
er threshold inquiry. The public forum analysis provides a
framework for evaluating rights of speech access to govern-
ment property by determining "when the Government's inter-
est in limiting the use of its property to its intended purpose
outweighs the interest of those wishing to use the property for
other purposes."' Public forum analysis categorizes govern-
ment property in accordance with the degree to which the
property has been opened--either by tradition or by govern-
ment action-to expressive activity. The doctrine is premised
on the notion that "[the existence of a right of access to public
property and the standard by which limitations upon such a
1 Lebron I, 811 F. Supp. at 1002.
' Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 473 US. 788, 800
(1985); see generally Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, The Mislading Nature of
Public Forum Analysis: Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70
VA. L. REV. 1219, 1220-21 (1984). This Article is indebted to Farber and Nowak
who articulate a critical view of the public forum doctrine.
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right must be evaluated differ depending on the character of
the property at issue.""2 As articulated in International Soci-
ety for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, cited by the panel,
public forum doctrine provides that
regulation of speech on government property that has traditionally
been available for public expression is subject to the highest scruti-
ny. Such regulations survive only if they are narrowly drawn to
achieve a compelling state interest. The second category of public
property is the designated public forum, whether of a limited or
unlimited character-property that the state has opened for expres-
sive activity by part or all of the public. Regulation of such property
is subject to the same limitations as that governing a traditional
public forum. Finally, there is all remaining public property. Limita-
tions on expressive activity conducted on this last category of prop-
erty must survive only a much more limited review. The challenged
regulation need only be reasonable, as long as the regulation is not
an effort to suppress the speaker's activity due to disagreement with
the speaker's view."4
Underlying the public forum doctrine is the Supreme
Court's long-standing recognition that "the State, no less than
a private owner of property, has power to preserve the proper-
ty under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicat-
ed.-
1. The Relevant Forum
The court of appeals began its forum analysis by defining
the relevant forum. The issue was whether the relevant forum
was just the Spectacular, as Amtrak argued, or Penn Station
advertising generally, as Lebron contended based upon the fact
that the same advertising standards applied throughout the
station. To answer this question, the panel looked to Cornelius
v. NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund,"' in which the
Supreme Court held that where legal defense and political
advocacy organizations were excluded from participating in a
Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983).
505 U.S. 672, 678-79 (1992) (citing Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46).
L Perry, 460 U.S. at 460 (quoting United States Postal Serv. v. Council
Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 129-30 (1981)); see Lee, 505 U.S. at 679;
Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47
(1966).
12 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
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federal fund-raising campaign, the relevant forum for purposes
of a First Amendment claim was the federal fund-raising cam-
paign, not the federal workplace generally. The Court in
Cornelius noted that its precedents dictated focusing on the ac-
cess sought by the speaker in determining "the perimeters of a
forum within the confines of government property."' In
Cornelius, access was sought to "a particular means of commu-
nication--the Combined Federal Campaign ("CFC")-rather
than to the federal workplace generally, and the Court accord-
ingly identified the CFC as the relevant forum.'
Applying this guidance in a strictly literal manner, the
panel concluded that the Spectacular was the relevant forum
because Lebron had sought access only to the Spectacular
because of its unique size, location and visibility, and because
he had refused, when Amtrak rejected his work, to accept any
other advertising space managed by TDI in New York.'
That conclusion provided the basis for the court's rejection of
Lebron's argument that Amtrak had created a designated
public forum for political speech by accepting the Plain Truth
advertisement and other noncommercial, issue-oriented adver-
tising elsewhere in the station.3 '
The court's decision to limit its public forum inquiry to the
Spectacular is not supported by the authority upon which it
purports to be based. As Chief Judge Newman pointed out in
dissent, in distinguishing a charity drive aimed at federal
employees from the entirety of the federal workplace, the
Cornelius Court focused on "a particular means of communica-
tion," not a particular location.' The cases relied upon by
Cornelius likewise focus on the mode of communication to
which the speakers had sought access. In Perry Education
Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association,"= the Court
identified a school district's interschool mail system, rather
than school property as a whole, as the relevant forum for
Iv Id. at 801.
128 Id. at 801-02.
Lebron I, 69 F.3d at 650, 655.
"' Id. at 656.
Id. at 660 (Newman, C.J., dissenting). In Cornelius, the Court rejected
petitioner's argument that a First Amendment forum "necessarily consists of tangi-
ble government property." 473 U.S. at 800-OL
m 460 U.S. 37, 46-47 (1983).
1996]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
analyzing the claims of an excluded teachers' organization, and
in Lehman,113 the Court identified advertising space on city-
owned buses as the relevant forum.
The circuit court cases upon which the panel relied also
support identifying the entirety of the particular mode of com-
munication to which the speaker sought access as the relevant
forum. In Air Line Pilots,' a pilot's union sought access to
diorama display cases in O'Hare Airport to display a "political"
advertisement critical of United Air Lines for having sold off
parts of Air Wisconsin, costing hundreds of Air Wisconsin
employees their jobs. The court's forum inquiry centered on
display cases in all of the airport terminals rather than just
those in the United Airlines concourse in which the union
sought to place its advertisements.13 5 In Hubbard Broadcast-
ing, Inc. v. Metropolitan Sports Facilities Commission,
36
where an advertiser sought access to advertising space on the
scoreboard in a municipally owned sports stadium, the court's
public forum inquiry focused on advertising space in the stadi-
um. The forum analysis in Air Line Pilots and Hubbard
squarely supports Lebron's argument that advertising display
spaces in Penn Station--"a particular means of communica-
tion"--were the relevant forum. In none of the cases cited by
the panel did the court physically dissect the advertising spac-
es into separate forums based upon their size or promi-
nence.
13 7
The fact that Lebron sought access to one particular dis-
play space-a fact that the panel turned against
Lebron-should not have been determinative. As Chief Judge
Newman pointed out:
It is unimaginable that in Cornelius the Court would have permitted
one political party to solicit funds through the Combined Federal
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
Airline Pilots Ass'n Intl v. Department of Aviation of Chicago, 45 F.3d 1144
(7th Cir. 1995).
135 Id. at 1154 (advertisements appearing in airport concourses other than that
to which the union sought access are relevant to consideration of advertising policy
and practice at airport).
138 797 F.2d 552, 555-56 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 986 (1986).
137 See Eagon v. City of Elk City, 72 F.3d 1480, 1485-87 (10th Cir. 1996)
(where a Republican club sought to display a sign at a Christmas event in a pub-
lic park, the relevant forum for First Amendment analysis was not the Christmas
event itself, but the public park).
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Campaign at one side of the lobby of a federal building while deny-
ing another party the opportunity to solicit funds through the Cam-
paign at the other side, or that in Perry the Court would have per-
mitted one group to place a political message in the mail boxes of
one school while denying another group a similar right at other
schools, or that in Lehman the Court would have permitted political
advertisements on one bus while prohibiting political advertisements
on other buses.'
The unique size of the Spectacular, in Chief Judge Newman's
view, was immaterial. He pointed out that there are two small-
er billboards atop the north and south walls of the rotunda,
while the west wall is occupied by the Spectacular. If Amtrak
were to permit the Democratic Party to place an advertisement
on one of those smaller billboards, he queried,
can it seriously be argued that any court would limit its forum anal-
ysis to the one large billboard and permit Amtrak to deny the Re-
publican Party the opportunity to place its political advertisement
on the Spectacular, just because no political advertisement had
previously been on that precise space?L
Chief Judge Newman concluded that the relevant forum
must at least be advertising space in the rotunda of Penn Sta-
tion-which would include the Plain Truth advertisement
directly in front of the Spectacular toward the center of the
rotunda.
The panel's conceptual severing of the Spectacular from all
other Penn Station advertising locations was further under-
mined by Amtrak's concession that it applies the same sub-
stantive policy to all advertising in the station. The fact that
for Lebron's purposes no other display space was acceptable
should not have rendered the station-wide scope of the policy
irrelevant.14
Lebron H, 69 F.3d at 661 (Newman, C.J., dissenting).
Id. The same point may be made with reference to a sports stadium: If the
Democratic Party were allowed to advertise on a small billboard beyond the right
field wall, could the Republican Party be prohibited from using a larger billboard
atop the scoreboard?
140 The Second Circuit has in the past looked beyond the specific speech venue
at issue to determine the nature of the forum, where, as here, the governments
policy encompassed multiple venues. In Deeper Life Christian Fellowship, Inc. v.
Board of Educ., 852 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1988), the court affirmed a preliminary
injunction ordering that a religious group be given access to a particular school,
P.S. 60, on a record showing that "the School Board has opened this forum to
Deeper Life through a practice of granting permits to use public school facilities to
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2. The Nature of the Forum
Once the relevant forum has been identified, the court
must examine the government's "policy and practice" with
respect to permitting speech access to the forum to determine
whether the government actor, here Amtrak, intended to cre-
ate a designated public forum.' The Supreme Court repeat-
edly has stated that the government "does not create a public
forum by inaction or by permitting limited discourse, but only
by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public dis-
course.' 42 Moreover, selective access does not transform gov-
ernment property into a public forum.' Government intent,
therefore, has emerged as the most significant factor in deter-
mining the nature of a forum for First Amendment purposes.
Several circuit courts have emphasized that the inquiry
into the government's policy and practice with respect to
speech access must be based upon objective evidence rather
than merely upon the government's asserted intent. In Grace
Bible Fellowship, Inc. v. Maine School Administration District
Number 5,'" the First Circuit stressed that "actual practice
speaks louder than words"45 in public forum analysis, and
other religious organizations." Id. at 680 (emphasis added). Because the challenged
policy was district-wide, the court did not limit its analysis to the particular
school building Deeper Life sought to use, but looked at prior uses of all school
facilities.
.1 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 802
(1985) ("the Court has looked to the policy and practice of the government to
ascertain" whether it created a designated public forum); Perry Educ. Ass'n v.
Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 47 (1983) ("[ilf by policy or by practice"
the school had opened the forum, it would create a designated public forum) (em-
phasis added).
14 Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802; see International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness,
Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 680 (1992).
" Although the extent to which the government can permit "selective access" to
property without creating a public forum is by no means clear, the Court has
permitted the government considerable latitude in this regard. In Perry, the Court
held that the fact that some outside organizations such as the YMCA, Cub Scouts
and other civic and church organizations had been given permission to use the
school mail facilities did not compel a finding that the facilities had been opened
.as a matter of course to all who seek to distribute material." 460 U.S. at 47; see
United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 733 (1990) (plurality opinion) (Postal
Service's allowances of "other types of potentially disruptive speech on a case-by-
case basis" does not convert postal premises into public forum).
14 941 F.2d 45 (1st Cir. 1991).
" Id. at 47.
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looked to prior uses of a school's facilities to determine that
those facilities were a designated public forum."4 6 In Stewart
v. District of Columbia Armory Board,"' the D.C. Circuit
similarly underscored the importance of past speech practices
and the compatibility of plaintiffs' speech with the forum, not-
ing that "it is from such objective factual indicia that the real
intent [to create a designated forum] is often inferred even
when expressed intent runs counter."4
As the Seventh Circuit stated in Air Line Pilots (in lan-
guage directly relevant to Amtrak's conduct in Lebron), a factu-
al inquiry into "consistent policy and practice" is necessary
because it "guards against the dangers of post-hoc policy for-
mulation or the discretionary enforcement of an effectively
inoperative policy. The government may not 'create' a policy to
implement its newly-discovered desire to suppress a particular
message.""
Lebron argued that through its practice of permitting
political advertisements under this policy, Amtrak had created
a designated public forum for political advertisements and had
discriminated on the basis of viewpoint when it refused to
display his advertisement.' The relevant facts, as found by
141 Id.
147 863 F.2d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
1 5 Id. at 1019; see Paulsen v. County of Nassau, 925 F.2d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 1991)
([olbjective indicia of intent to create a public forum, combined with a history of
consistent practice, can overcome a bare statement of contrary purpos e); Con-
cerned Women for America, Inc. v. Lafayette County, 883 F.2d 32, 33-34 (5th Cir.
1989) (looking to library's past practices to override asserted policy against use of
public library for political or religious purposes).
14 Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Intl v. Department of Aviation of the City of Chicago,
45 F.3d 1144, 1153 (7th Cir. 1995). The court also noted that if the government
relies upon a "policy" to demonstrate that it has not opened a forum for commu-
nicative activity, that policy "Must be something more than a strategy adopted or
relied upon for the purposes of litigation. .. [Olbjective indicia of intent are ...
more telling in forum analysis" Id at 1154 (citing Stewart v. District of Columbia
Armory Bd., 863 F.2d 1013, 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).
" Cases in which courts have found that a designated public forum was creat-
ed in public transportation facilities include Lebron v. Washington Metro. Area
Transit Auth., 749 F.2d 893, 896 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (WMATA created a limited pub-
lic forum in Washington subway stations by accepting political advertisements in
the past); Penthouse Int'l Ltd. v. Koch, 599 F. Supp. 1338, 1349 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(New York City Transit Authority created limited public forum by accepting polit-
ical advertisements in its subway system); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Chicago
Transit Auth., 592 F. Supp. 544, 553 (N.D. IMI. 1984), affd, 767 F.2d 1225 (7th
Cir. 1985) (Chicago transit system created limited public forum for pro-abortion
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the district court, were not challenged on appeal: Amtrak re-
peatedly had displayed noncommercial, political advertise-
ments in Penn Station, including-for five years-an advertise-
ment for The Plain Truth immediately in front of the Spectacu-
lar. 5' By Amtrak's own account, one substantive policy gov-
erned all advertising in Penn Station, including the Spectacu-
lar, and Amtrak had never before rejected an advertisement as
"political." Moreover, objective evidence of Amtrak's policy-a
contract with its advertising agent, TDI-expressly provided
for the display of public service advertisements for nonprofit
organizations.
The court of appeals at first ignored these factual findings
entirely. In light of Amtrak's "clear" practice of never having
opened the Spectacular for "anything except purely commercial
advertising," the panel concluded that the Spectacular was
either a -nonpublic forum or a limited public forum opened for
purely commercial speech.'52 In its revised opinion, the court
acknowledged the uniformity of Amtrak's policy throughout the
station but failed to acknowledge the significance of that uni-
formity to the public forum analysis.
The need to look to objective indicia of prior practice was
especially critical in Lebron, where Amtrak relied on an un-
written, undisseminated policy that it had never before assert-
ed to exclude similar speakers. The panel stressed that no
political advertisements had been displayed on the Spectacu-
lar, but it failed to note that no one before Lebron had sought
to display a political advertisement there. The evidence the
panel disregarded demonstrated that where people previously
had sought to display political advertisements under the same
policy, Amtrak had always permitted them to do so. Had the
panel examined Amtrak's objective practices in administering
its policy stationwide rather than deferring to its post hoc
messages by permitting other "controversial" public service announcements); Coali-
tion for Abortion Rights v. Niagara Frontier Transp. Auth., 584 F. Supp. 985, 989
(W.D.N.Y. 1984) (public bus company created limited public forum by permitting
political and public service advertisements); Gay Activists Alliance of Washington,
D.C., Inc. v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., No. 78 Civ. 2217 (D.D.C. July
5, 1979) (WMATA created limited public 'forum by accepting advertisements deal-
ing with social and political topics).
.. The Plain Truth advertisement was removed sometime after Lebron com-
menced his action.
... Lebron II, 69 F.3d at 656.
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justification and narrowly focusing on the Spectacular, it would
have concluded that Amtrak created a designated public fo-
rum.
The panel's refusal to acknowledge the relevance of
Amtraks practice of allowing political advertisements else-
where in Penn Station under what Amtrak admitted was a sin-
gle, stationwide policy, "emptie[d] the limited-public-forum
concept of all its meaning." ' Under the panel's approach, a
public school that had permitted outside Protestant and Catho-
lic groups to use meeting rooms on its second floor could deny
a Jewish group access to a larger first floor room by asserting
a policy against any outside groups using school rooms. If the
first floor room had not previously been used by outside
groups, the school's decision would be upheld, even though
other religious groups had been granted access to other rooms
under the same policy. Discrimination can always be made to
look neutral by narrowing the scope of analysis to ignore cases
of different treatment.
In support of its conclusion that the Spectacular was ei-
ther a nonpublic forum or a limited public forum opened only
for "purely commercial speech," ' the panel relied in part up-
on Calash v. City of Bridgeport.'s In Calash, the court held
that the city was not required to make a sports arena available
to a commercial rock concert promoter even though permission
previously had been given for a Beach Boys concert to benefit
various charitable organizations. The court held that even
though the concert would not be incompatible with the
property's principal function as a sports arena, plaintiff's exclu-
sion was not unconstitutional because the city had the right to
limit access to the arena to civic, charitable and nonprofit
11 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 815
(1985) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
1' As the majority's opinion indicates, the distinction between a limited public
forum, which the government has opened for expressive activity for a limited
amount of time, for a limited class of speakers, or for a limited number of topics,
see Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983), and
a nonpublic forum, which the government has not opened for expressive activity
but which may be used for activities that further the forum's business or the goals
the government uses the property to serve, is not always clear. Cornelius, 473
U.S. at 819-20 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
m 788 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1986).
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organizations, as had been its consistent policy.5 ' Relying
upon Perry and Cornelius, the Calash court held that the city
had not intended to open the stadium to the general public for
all uses or permit its use for profit-making purposes, and that
the stadium was therefore a nonpublic forum. 5' The court
further held that even if the city had created a limited public
forum, under Perry the right of access extended only to "enti-
ties of similar character" to those permitted access." 8 Since
the plaintiff was not a civic, charitable or nonprofit speaker,
exclusion was permissible because it was consistent with the
limits the city had placed on access."5 9
One problem with the panel's reliance on Calash is that in
Calash the city adopted a written policy prohibiting use of the
stadium by profit-making entities, 6 ' whereas Amtrak had no
operative written policy excluding either political or noncom-
mercial advertisers from the Spectacular or any other part of
Penn Station. Thus, in Calash, the class of speakers granted
(and, by implication, the class denied) access were defined
clearly. But even assuming that Amtrak's policy against politi-
cal advertising were clearly set forth and sufficiently precise to
be readily comprehensible, a ban on "political" speech does not
address the permissible class of speakers. Corporations, for
instance, engage in political speech all the time. For example,
Mobil Oil regularly places political advertisements on the Op
Ed page of the New York Times.'' Thus, Amtrak's policy
lacked the objective basis for distinguishing between appro-
priate speakers that was present in Calash. Accordingly,
Amtrak's exclusion of Lebron, and its attempt to define the
Spectacular as a forum limited to commercial speech, could not
be justified by reference to clear, objective standards, thus
rendering Calash inapposite.
15 Id. at 84.
57 Id. at 83.
2" Id. at 84 (citing Perry, 460 U.S. at 48). In Perry, the result turned entirely
on the fact that the educational association that permitted access to the school's
internal mail system was the teachers' official bargaining representative, whereas
the excluded association lacked the same official status.
159 Id.
0 Calash, 788 F.2d at 84.
". See, e.g., N.Y. TZIES, Oct. 31, 1996, at A29 (Mobil advertisement entitled
"The Top 10 Reasons For Voting November 5th").
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Moreover, as discussed above, "political" standing alone
does not define adequately the category of speech to be exclud-
ed from the forum. Indeed, the evidence of Amtrak's previous
acceptance of political and public service advertising in Penn
Station was inconsistent with its asserted ban on such adver-
tising.
Another factor relevant to evaluating claims of speech
access to public property is the physical characteristics and
function of the forum and its context. Compatibility of the
speech with the purposes of the forum, considered in its broad-
er context, frequently has been a component of the Supreme
Court's review of speech restrictions on government proper-
ty."c However, in Cornelius, the Court pointed out that the
nature of the property and its compatibility with expressive
activity are relevant "to discern the government's intent," not
as part of an objective inquiry into the nature of the forum."c
Several members of the Supreme Court, taking issue with the
Court's analysis in Cornelius, have highlighted the importance
of utilizing objective criteria to establish the proper level of
scrutiny to be applied to speech restrictions on public property.
Justice Kennedy has observed, "If our public forum jurispru-
dence is to retain vitality, we must recognize that certain ob-
jective characteristics of Government property and its custom-
ary use by the public may control the case." " Justices Ken-
nedy, Blackmun, Stevens and Souter, concurring in Lee, stated
that "the [public forum] inquiry must be an objective one,
based on the actual, physical characteristics and uses of the
property."
165
16 International Soey for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 682
(1992) (purpose of airport terminals to facilitate efficient air travel supports find-
ing that they are not public fora); see, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense
and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 801-02 (1985) (identification of the CFC rather
than the federal workplace as the relevant forum did not preclude considering the
special nature and function of the federal workplace in evaluating restrictions on
access to CFC); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 n.5 (1981) (university cam-
pus possesses many characteristics of a traditional public forum).
16 Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802.
16 United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 737-38 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring).
11 505 U.S. at 695. In Lee, although the Court concluded that the airport ter-
minals at issue were nonpublic fora, the Court distinguished between airports and
other transportation centers. The Court noted that airports, unlike bus and rail
terminals, have "security magnets," restrict public access and are visited almost
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In U.S. Southwest Africa/Namibia Trade & Cultural
Council v. United States, the D.C. Circuit noted that the adver-
tising display cases in National and Dulles Airports were "an
organic part" of the airport terminals and that, in undertaking
public forum analysis, the advertising displays "cannot be who-
lly divorced.., from the nature of the public place in which
they occur."166 This observation is especially pertinent to the
Spectacular, which is a huge, illuminated, curving wall that
helps define the contours of the rotunda. Penn Station is a
major thoroughfare, transportation center and underground
mall for hundreds of thousands of New Yorkers every day. In
addition to the political advertisements noted above, Amtrak
also has permitted various other forms of political speech in
Penn Station. Copies of The Plain Truth have been distributed
freely from an advertising kiosk in the rotunda. Under
Amtrak's "Free Speech" access policy, anyone may receive a
permit to distribute leaflets and express political points of
view. News agents and booksellers advertise and sell books
and magazines with political points of view throughout the
station. Notably, the record contained no evidence that Amtrak
ever had received a complaint about political speech of any
kind in the station. Thus, political speech is clearly compatible
with Penn Station's other uses in the same way political
speech is compatible with a downtown sidewalk. In fact, the
only thing that distinguishes the Penn Station thoroughfare
from a downtown sidewalk is that it is underground. 67
exclusively for travel-related purposes. The Court also noted that bus and rail
terminals traditionally have been privately owned, which was true of Penn Station
until 1967.
708 F.2d 760, 766 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Rejecting the trial court's focus solely on
the advertising displays without considering their context, the D.C. Circuit stated
that such analysis "distorts the first amendment realities of this particular medi-
um of communication at these particular public places." Id. Although the court's
conclusion that the airport terminals were public fora was effectively overruled by
the Supreme Court in Lee, its analysis of the relationship between advertising
displays and the terminals as a whole remains valid. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at
802 (nature and function of federal workplace relevant to evaluating restrictions on
access to fund-raising campaign); Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. Department of
Aviation of the City of Chicago, 45 F.3d 1114, 1156 (7th Cir. 1995) (both broader
physical context and commercial purpose of airport advertising displays must be
considered in public forum inquiry).
17 The panel's failure to consider the physical characteristics and prior uses of
Penn Station and its advertising is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's plurality
decision in Lee, 505 U.S. at 690-91 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In Lee, the Court
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As Chief Judge Newman pointed out in dissent, the panel's
failure to consider the physical setting of the Spectacular also
leads to insupportable results. It plainly would be unconstitu-
tional for Amtrak to lease some billboard space in the Penn
Station rotunda to the Democratic Party and simultaneously to
deny the Spectacular to the Republicans on the ground that
their speech violated a policy against "political" advertising in
Penn Station. Yet that is effectively what Amtrak did. The
Plain Truth was permitted to run an advertisement urging
viewers to "Say No to Adultery," but Lebron was barred from
displaying an advertisement that effectively urged viewers to
"Say No to Coors." Since Amtrak had only one policy, there
was no justification for treating Lebron differently.
The extremely public nature of Penn Station, including the
rotunda, appears to have had no bearing whatsoever upon the
court of appeals' forum analysis. Indeed, the distinction be-
tween Penn Station and the restricted access fora at issue in
other First Amendment public forum cases could hardly be
more striking."c The Spectacular and its indoor mall-like en-
vironment are also quite different from the public buses at
issue in Lehman or the airport terminals at issue in Lee. Sure-
ly these clear differences in relationship between the forum
and the public at large should have been germane to the
court's forum analysis. Because the court was content to over-
look the overwhelmingly public character of the station, New
York City subway riders (a captive audience under Lehman) in
the past year have seen advertisements protesting Citibank's
held that a restriction on the distribution of pamphlets was not "reasonable in
light of the purposes of the forum" because there was no evidence that leafletting
would cause any disruption of the airport's other uses. Here, had the panel consid-
ered the evidence showing that prior political speech in Penn Station had never
created a problem, it would have found Amtrak's policy unreasonable, just as the
Court had in Lee. The only justification the panel cited for the policy-avoiding
the appearance of favoring some political views-cannot be reconciled with the fact
that Amtrak has permitted other political speech in Penn Station, including polit-
ical advertisements and even solicitation for political causes, without any adverse
effects.
"6 Cornelius, 473 U.S. 788 (fund-raising campaign in federal workplace); Perry
Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983) (mail system in
public school); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (military base); Adderley v.
Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (state prison).
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labor practices, but Lebron's advertisement was excluded from
the Spectacular, part of an enormous open area to which the
captive audience rationale would seem inapposite.
One obvious problem with the public forum doctrine, as
articulated by the Supreme Court and as applied by the Sec-
ond Circuit in Lebron, is that deference to government intent
in classifying the forum eliminates (or greatly diminishes the
significance of) consideration of the compatibility of the speech
with the forum. In Cornelius, for instance, the Court consid-
ered compatibility of the property with expressive activity only
as bearing upon the government's intent. The Court found that
the government's policy and practice did not demonstrate an
intent to open the CFC to all tax-exempt organizations 69 and
emphasized that "strict incompatibility between the nature of
the speech or the identity of the speaker and the functioning of
[a] nonpublic forum is not mandated."170 Justice Blackmun,
dissenting in Cornelius, emphasized the circular reasoning
involved in classifying the forum on the basis of government
intent:
If the Government does not create a limited public forum unless it
intends to provide an "open forum" for expressive activity, and if the
exclusion of some speakers is evidence that the Government did not
intend to create such a forum, no speaker challenging denial of ac-
cess will ever be able to prove that the forum is a limited public
forum.
171
Justice Blackmun's concern, shared by Justices Kennedy,
Souter, Stevens'72 and Brennan, 7 ' is that government regu-
lation of speech on public property effectively evades judicial
oversight if courts categorize the forum solely with regard to
the government's intent and fail to consider the compatibility
of the speech in question with the uses of the forum.1
4
1" Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 804.
170 Id. at 808.
171 Id. at 825 (citation omitted).
1 International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 605 U.S. at 695
(1992) (Stevens, J., concurring).
17. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 751 (1990) (Brennan, J. dissenting).
... As Justice Blackmun put it in Cornelius:
Rather than recognize that a nonpublic forum is a place where expressive
activity would be incompatible with the purposes the property is intended
to serve, the Court states that a nonpublic forum is a place where we
need not even be concerned about whether expressive activity is incom-
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The panel's analysis vividly illustrates the threat to speech
access to public property posed by such uncritical judicial def-
erence to the governmental objectives for content-based speech
restrictions in determining the nature of the forum. As Justice
Brennan noted in United States v. Kokinda:
Ironically, these public forum categories [public, limited-purpose
public, and nonpublic]-originally conceived of as a way of preserv-
ing First Amendment rights-have been used in some of our recent
decisions as a means of upholding restrictions on speech."
That is precisely what happened in Lebron.
3. Reasonableness
A restriction of speech in a nonpublic forum "need only be
reasonable; it need not be the most reasonable or the only
reasonable limitation."'76 The court of appeals viewed
Lehman as dispositive of the reasonableness of Amtrakls ban
on political advertising on the Spectacular. As noted above, in
Lehman, the plurality found that car card spaces on city buses
were a nonpublic forum and that the city's exclusion of politi-
cal advertisements was reasonable to protect revenues, to
spare a captive audience from "the blare of political propagan-
da" and to avoid "lurking doubts about favoritism."" In the
plurality's view, these were "reasonable legislative objectives
... advanced by the city in a proprietary capacity."
78
patible with the purposes of the property.
473 U.S. at 820-21, (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
1 497 U.S. at 741 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted); cee Perry Educ.
Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 57 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) ("In focusing on the public forum issue, the Court disregards the First
Amendments central proscription against censorship, in the form of viewpoint
discrimination, in any forum, public or nonpublic.').
17I Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 808; Lee, 505 U.S. at 683; Kohinda, 497 U.S. at 730
(plurality opinion).
1 Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974) (plurality opin-
ion).
1 I& at 303-04. The Lebron panel also relied upon Lee, in which the Court
(relying in turn upon Kokinda and Lehman) stated. 'Were the government is
acting as a proprietor, managing its internal operations, rather than acting as
lawmaker with the power to regulate or license, its action will not be subjected to
the heightened review to which its actions as a lawmaker may be subject. Lee,
505 U.S. at 678.
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As Lebron pointed out, however, the majority in Lehman
was provided by Justice Douglas, who in his concurrng opin-
ion relied upon "the right of the commuters to be free from
forced intrusions on their privacy."'" In Justice Douglas'
view, consideration of the constitutional rights of the passen-
gers "precludes the city from transforming its vehicles of public
transportation into forums for the dissemination of ideas upon
this captive audience."' Notwithstanding its citation to the
holding in Lehman in several cases that did not involve captive
audiences,' the. Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized
the dependence of Lehman on the "captive audience" rationale,
which applies only in settings where there is a substantial
intrusion on privacy.8 2
Following Lehman, the panel concluded that "Amtrak's
decision, as a proprietor, to decline to enter the political arena,
even indirectly, by displaying political advertisements is cer-
tainly reasonable."" The panel based this conclusion upon
the advisability of avoiding "the criticism and the embarrass-
ments of allowing any display seeming to favor any political
view," particularly in light of the unique size of the Spectacu-
lar.14
Avoiding the appearance of political favoritism is a valid
justification for limiting speech in a nonpublic forum,"8 but
"" Lehman, 418 U.S. at 307 (Douglas, J., concurring).
18 Id.
... See Lebron II, 69 F.3d at 657 n.3 (citing cases).
'" See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 514 n.19 (1981)
(plurality opinion) (Lehman turned on a "unique fact situation[ ]" having no appli-
cation to consideration of outdoor billboards); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public
Serv. Cornm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 539-40 (1980); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422
U.S. 205, 209 (1975) (rejecting captive audience rationale for ordinance barring nu-
dity in films shown by drive-in theater and distinguishing Lehman on ground that
intrusion of privacy is greater for passenger on bus than for person on street); see
U.S. Southwest Africa/Namibia Trade & Cultural Council v. United States, 708
F.2d 760, 767 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (distinguishing the more expansive, open areas of
an airport terminal from the crowded confines of the buses at issue in Lehman).
But see Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 37 n.9
(1983) (rejecting Justice Brennan's characterization of Lehman as limited in scope
and involving an "unusual" forum); Lebron II, 69 F.3d at 657 n.3 (citation omit-
ted); Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. Department of Aviation of the City of Chicago,
45 F.3d 1114, 1153 n.3 (7th Cir. 1995) (declining to limit Lehman to situations in-
volving captive audiences).
1" Lebron II, 69 F.3d at 658.
184 Id.
"8 Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974); Greer v. Spock,
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not in a limited public forum.' The panel's willingness to
accept this justification for Amtrakls policy illustrates the ex-
tent to which meaningful judicial scrutiny of content restric-
tions is cut off by designating the forum "nonpublic." First, the
panel reached its decision without any evidence that other non-
commercial advertisements in Penn Station, including the
Plain Truth advertisement which directly confronted pedestri-
ans crossing through the rotunda, had given rise to questions
about favoritism.' Second, the panel failed to mention that
the advertisement states clearly that Lebron paid for the work
and disclaims any association between the work and TIDI, Am-
trak, or The Port Authority of New York & New Jersey."' s6
Third, the panel gave no consideration to the First Amendment
interests at stake. Finally, the court failed to consider the
availability of alternative means by which Lebron could have
communicated his message. In both Perry and Cornelius, the
availability of other means by which the speakers could have
reached the same audience was expressly considered in evalu-
ating the reasonableness of the restrictions at issue.ss In
Lebron, where the court was well aware that Lebron had de-
signed his work specifically for the Spectacular so as to reach a
particular audience and that he had rejected as inadequate
other advertising locations throughout the city, the absence of
an equally effective alternative forum was not even considered.
A central purpose of the First Amendment, "to assure [the]
unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of politi-
cal and social changes desired by the people"--a purpose
424 U.S. 828, 839 (1976); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund,
Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 809 (1985).
" Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 (1981); see Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 829
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
" In Cornelius, the Court pointed to record evidence supporting the inference
that permitting legal defense and political advocacy groups to participate in the
CFC would jeopardize the success of the campaign. 473 U.S. at 810-11.
1S See U.S. Southwest Africa/Namibia Trade & Cultural Council v. United
States, 708 F.2d 760, 772 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("To the extent that the FAA wishes to
ensure that political advertisements are not misconstrued as official pronounce-
ments of government policy, it can serve this end by the far less restrictive alter-
native of printing disclaimers ... in much the same way that it now displays
printed disclaimers regarding the political views espoused by leaftletters and solici-
tors.").
" Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 809; Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 53 (1983).
' Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (per curiam) (quoting Roth v. United
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that would have been directly advanced by the display of
Lebron's advertisement-was accorded no weight under the
court's public forum analysis. However understandable
Amtrak's interest in maintaining a level of decorum in the
station, the court jettisoned its role as a guardian of constitu-
tional rights by failing to consider whether the need for
Amtrak's content-based restrictions on speech outweighed
Lebron's First Amendment rights or that the restrictions were
administered in a principled, non-arbitrary manner according
to clear standards.
In short, the panel used public forum doctrine to foreclose
a balancing of the competing interests, with unfortunate conse-
quences both for Lebron's freedom of expression and the public
interest in informed debate on issues of public importance.
4. Viewpoint Neutrality
Speech regulations in nonpublic fora must be viewpoint
neutral as well as reasonable in light of the purposes of the fo-
rum.'9' The government "violates the First Amendment when
it denies access to a speaker solely to suppress the point of
view he espouses on an otherwise includible subject."192 View-
point discrimination is "censorship in its purest form."W93 As
the Supreme Court recently has made clear in Lamb's Chapel
v. Center Moriches Union Free School District94  and
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virgin-
ia,'95 the doctrine is not limited to discrimination against one
side of a dispute. Rather, it extends to discrimination against
entire categories of speech, such as religious speech.'
States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
191 Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806; Perry, 460 U.S. at 46; International Society for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 687 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring).
1 Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806; see Perry, 460 U.S. at 61 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) ("Once the government permits discussion of certain subject matter, it may
not impose restrictions that discriminate among viewpoints on those subjects
whether a nonpublic forum is involved or not.").
"3 Perry, 460 U.S. at 62 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
14 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
11 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
"" See infra note 197.
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Lebron argued that even if the panel were to find Penn
Station advertising to be a nonpublic forum, Amtrak's policy
would be unconstitutional because it is not neutral as to view-
point. Based on DeAngelo's invocation of the language in the
superseded 1980 Amtrak-TDI contract, which prohibited politi-
cal advertising that would be objectionable to Amtrak's passen-
gers, Lebron argued that such a policy effectively gave a
heckler's veto to Amtrak's passengers because the policy expre-
ssly turned on the hostility of the audience to the speaker's
point of view, an unconstitutional basis for restricting speech.
Lebron also advanced two additional bases for finding
Amtrak's policy to be viewpoint discriminatory. First, in allow-
ing the Plain Truth advertisement, with its fundamentalist
Christian messages on the European Community, homosexuali-
ty, adultery and gambling in the same room as the Spectacu-
lar, while rejecting Lebron's advertisement because it was
political, Amtrak impermissibly discriminated between political
viewpoints. Second, relying on Lamb's Chapel and
Rosenberger,97 Lebron argued that rejecting his advertise-
ment, which effectively urged viewers not to buy Coors beer for
political reasons, under a policy that would permit a Coors
beer advertisement urging viewers to buy the beer was view-
point discriminatory.
The district court agreed with Lebron that if, "as Mr.
DeAngelo sometimes testified," Amtrak's policy were "directed
against divisive, controversial, or objectionable matter," or if it
gave Amtrak "discretion to refuse any advertising involving
'views which could result in dissension or involve [Amtrak] in
dissension, complaints or controversy with its patrons or the
197 In Lamb's Chapel, the Supreme Court held that a public school district en-
gaged in impermissible viewpoint discrimination when it denied a religious group
access to its property to show religious films. 508 US. at 392-94. The Court rea-
soned that the school's across-the-board ban on "religiou films constituted view-
point discrimination because secular films on the same subject matter were not
banned. It was irrelevant that there was no showing that any particular religious
viewpoint was disfavored; the categorical rejection of religious films was sufficient
to constitute viewpoint discrimination. Id. Likewise, in Rosenberger, the university's
ban on finding for a student religious publication was held to discriminate on the
basis of viewpoint, since it was not a prohibition against religion as a subject but
rather against student journalism with a religious editorial viewpoint. 115 S. Ct.
at 2517. Thus, in both cases "religious7 speech was singled out for exclusion.
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public... ,' it would be void."19 The trial court noted that
speech such as Lebron's "cannot be prohibited... merely be-
cause it provokes disagreements and offends the sensibilities of
the majority .... It is precisely this speech for which the pro-
tection of the First Amendment was intended."199
The district court also opined that if the policy was as set
forth in TDrs guidelines, it would be void for the same reason,
"for these guidelines are designed to ensure against advertising
that is controversial, in bad taste, or inconsistent with the
taste and preferences of the majority of the community,""0
standards which the court held impermissible for a govern-
ment actor, as it had found Amtrak to be.2"'
The court of appeals panel conceded that if Amtrak's policy
were used to screen out only controversial political advertise-
ments, it would be void for viewpoint bias." 2 However, rely-
ing upon the 1967 and 1980 agreements with TDI, which the
district court had found were no longer even in effect,2 3 and
DeAngelo's testimony as to his understanding of the language
in those contracts, the panel concluded: "[it seems more sensi-
ble to read the language as a justification, however inartfully
phrased, for a categorical ban against political advertising
rather than as a test for discriminating against certain types of
political advertisements."2 4
The panel dismissed as "specious" Lebron's argument that
Amtrak engaged in viewpoint discrimination by refusing to
display his advertisement urging viewers not to buy Coors beer
because of the causes which the profits would be used to sup-
port. In the panel's view, the subject matter of Lebron's work
"can hardly be described, with any remote sense of accuracy, as
the merits or demerits of Coors beer. As Lebron himself stated
in an affidavit, 'I do not seek to sell anything other than ideas
with this advertisement.' 0 5 Since the panel limited its anal-
198 Lebron I, 811 F. Supp. at 1004 (quoting 1980 Amtrak-TDI contract).
Id. (quoting Penthouse Intl Ltd. v. Koch, 599 F. Supp. 1338, 1350 (S.D.N.Y.
1984)).
210 Id. at 1002.
201 Id. at 1004-05.
2' Lebron II, 69 F.3d at 658.
2" Lebron I, 811 F. Supp. at 1002.
20 Lebron II, 69 F.3d at 658 (citation omitted).
201 Id. at 659 n.4.
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ysis to the Spectacular, it avoided entirely Lebron's argument
that rejecting his advertisement while displaying the Plain
Truth advertisement constituted viewpoint discrimination.
In dissent, Chief Judge Newman opined that Amtrak may
well have engaged in viewpoint discrimination. He noted that
Lebron
makes a substantial argument that viewpoint-based discrimination
is occurring when government allows an advertisement promoting
the sale of a product, but purports to prohibit an advertisement
opposing a product because of the views of its manufacturer. Pre-
sumably, Amtrak would allow an advertisement opposing the sale of
Coor's [sic] beer because of its alcoholic content or for any reason
unrelated to the views of its manufacturer. - 3
The majority, however, avoided a thoughtful analysis of
the viewpoint discrimination issue. It simply interpreted away
the ambiguity as to whether Amtraks policy prohibited all
political advertisements or just objectionable or controversial
political advertisements. Although conceding that the language
being construed was "inartfully phrased"-an odd admission
for a court to make regarding a speech regulation it proceeds
to uphold-the court construed it in the manner most favorable
to Amtrak.
DeAngelo had testified that he understood the policy to
prohibit, in relevant part, advertisements that are "objection-
able to our riding public and others associated with us includ-
ing political and other types of potentially controversial mat-
ters."0 7 To the district court, this testimony meant that
Amtrak's policy prohibited "only those advertisements that
were both 'political' and divisive or objectionable." 3 The dis-
trict court also found that the content of Amtrak's policy was
unclear and that Amtrak's witnesses offered conflicting ver-
sions of the policy." 9 Moreover, evidence of numerous politi-
cal advertisements throughout the station strongly suggested
2w Id. at 662-63 (Newman, C.J., dissenting). Chief Judge Newman did not de-
cide the viewpoint discrimination issue, since he found it unnecessary to do so in
order to affirm the district court's decision.
20 Record on Appeal at A354, Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 69 F.3d
650 (2d Cir. 1995), amended, reh'g denied, 74 F.3d 371 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 1675 (1996).
2 Lebron I, 811 F. Supp. at 1002.
20 Id.
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that some political advertisements were acceptable, while oth-
ers, like Lebron's, were not. On such a record, it would seem to
be an abandonment of principled decisionmaking to construe in
the least constitutionally objectionable manner a superseded
policy impervious to ready comprehension.
Having construed the policy as banning all "political" ad-
vertisements the court still was confronted with the Lamb's
Chapel argument: Could Amtrak permit an advertisement for
Coors beer but reject an anti-Coors beer advertisement? The
court's footnote disposing of this argument is hardly convinc-
ing. Lebron did not contend, as the court implies, that his
advertisement addressed the merits or demerits of Coors
beer. 1' Rather, he stated that his advertisement urged peo-
ple not to buy Coors beer because, in doing so, they were con-
tributing profits to Coors that were used to support a right-
wing political agenda that, in Lebron's view, was destructive of
civil rights at home and supportive of civil war abroad. In
other words, Lebron argued that to the extent the desirability
of purchasing Coors beer would be an acceptable subject for an
advertisement, expressing a "political" viewpoint on that sub-
ject would be permissible under Lamb's Chapel.
The relevant portion of the text of Lebron's advertisement
states, "When you buy Coors products, you help them turn
back civil rights, censure high school textbooks, weaken labor
laws and environmental protections, promote homophobia, and
meddle in foreign affairs." Lebron's testimony that he did not
seek to.sell anything other than ideas with the advertisement
was merely an acknowledgement that the work was noncom-
mercial; it is in no way inconsistent with his argument that
the thrust of his advertisement was to urge people not to buy
Coors beer.
The panel's decision cannot readily be reconciled with
Lamb's Chapel, Rosenberger or the circuit court decisions
which also have held that across-the-board bans on "religious"
speech constitute impermissible viewpoint discrimination."'
210 Lebron II, 69 F.3d at 659 n.4.
21 See Grossbaum v. Indianapolis-Marion County Bldg. Auth., 63 F.3d 581 (7th
Cir. 1995) (ban on all religious displays in public building lobby invalidated as
viewpoint-based); Good News/Good Sports Club v. School Dist. of Laude, 28 F.3d
1501 (8th Cir. 1994) (invalidating policy prohibiting religious speech in school as
viewpoint-based), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2640 (1995); Hedges v. Wauconda Corn-
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In Air Line Pilots, the Seventh Circuit stated that if an across-
the-board ban on "religious" speech constitutes viewpoint dis-
crimination, so does an across-the-board ban on "political"
speech." It "matters little whether the entire category of
'political' speech was prohibited,"" the court reasoned, be-
cause if other speech on the subject would have been permit-
ted, the ban is viewpoint-based.214 The Seventh Circuit ex-
plained that the district court's holding that no viewpoint dis-
crimination had occurred because all "political" advertisements
were barred was flawed because that determination "effectively
avoided viewpoint inquiry by retreating to an exaggerated level
of generality. The appropriate focus of the viewpoint inquiry
examines whether the proposed speech dealt with a subject
that was 'otherwise permissible' in a given forum." '15
The Air Line Pilots court criticized an approach to the
viewpoint discrimination inquiry that would permit speech to
be excluded on the basis of a category label rather than on the
basis of the subject matter being addressed. As the court there
noted, "[a] view labelled as 'political' (presumably because it is
controversial or challenges the status quo) may nevertheless
exist in opposition to a view that has otherwise been included
in a forum."2
1 6
Of course, even accepting the propriety of the more dis-
cerning viewpoint analysis urged by the Seventh Circuit, the
issue remains whether the general subject matter addressed by
the speech in question previously has been, or in theory could
be, permitted in the forum. In AIDS Action Committee of Mas-
sachusetts, Inc. v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority,
the First Circuit held that the suppression of condom adver-
munity Unit Sch. Dist. No. 118, 9 F.3d 1295, 1297 (7th Cir. 1993) (school policy
prohibiting all religious written material invalidated as viewpoint discrimination).
21 Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Department of Aviation of the City of Chicago, 45
F.3d 1144, 1159 (7th Cir. 1995).
213 Id.
21I Id. The Rosenberger Court also rejected the argument that no viewpoint
discrimination had occurred because an entire class of viewpoints had been dis-
criminated against. The Court held that "exclusion of several views on [a] problem
is just as offensive to the First Amendment as exclusion of only one." Rosenberger
v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, 115 S. CL 2510, 2517 (1995).
212 Air Line Pilots, 45 F.3d at 1159 (citing Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriche3
Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394 (1993)).
216 Id. at 1159.
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tisements that used sexual innuendo and double entendre to
convey their message constituted viewpoint discrimination
where the transit authority had displayed an advertisement for
the movie "Fatal Instinct," which the court found "more overtly
sexual and more blatantly exploitative" than the proposed
condom advertisements.217 In that case, the court examined
whether the aspect of the speech that formed the basis for its
exclusion, its sexual content, previously had been permitted in
the forum and found that it had. The cases in which the Su-
preme Court has found violations of viewpoint neutrality like-
wise demonstrate that the pertinent inquiry focuses on
whether the objected-to aspect of the speech in question is of a
general type that previously has been permitted in the fo-
run.
2 18
The display of the Plain Truth advertisement in the same
portion of the station as the Spectacular clearly constituted
viewpoint discrimination: Conservative, religious discussion of
social and political issues was permitted, while Lebron's liber-
al, secular discussion of social and political issues was exclud-
ed under the same policy. But Lebron's argument that rejec-
tion of his advertisement based upon its message not to buy
Coors beer on political grounds was viewpoint discrimination
presented a more difficult question.
Consistent with the Seventh Circuit's analysis in Air Line
Pilots, Lebron asked the panel to look beyond the labels "politi-
cal" and "commercial" to the general subject being ad-
dressed.219 But how should that subject matter properly be
217 42 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 1994).
218 See, e.g., City of Madison, Joint Sch. Dist. v. Wisconsin Employment Rela-
tions Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976) (striking down state order that board of educa-
tion prohibits employees other than union representatives from speaking at board
meetings on matters subject to collective bargaining); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (striking down decision by school offi-
cials to suspend students for wearing black arm bands to protest Vietnam War
where students had been permitted to wear symbols related to othei politically
significant issues); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951) (invalidating denial
of Jehovah's Witnesses to public park to give Bible talks where other religious
organizations had been given access for purposes related to religion).
"' Because Amtrak's policy is so vague, it is not clear whether Budweiser, a
commercial advertiser, could include political messages similar to Lebron's in a
Spectacular advertisement. Such ambiguity is where the problems of vagueness
and viewpoint discrimination dovetail. It is interesting to speculate as to what
Amtrak would have done had Budweiser sought to lease the Spectacular for an
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framed? The panel took the view that the merits of Coors beer
is a subject otherwise includible in the forum, but the politics
of the Coors family is not. Lebron argued for a broader view of
the pertinent subject, namely whether to buy Coors beer. If the
forum is open to commercial speech, Lebron contended, non-
commercial political speech critical of commercial messages
cannot be excluded. In this regard, it is significant to note that
Lebron's proposed advertisement incorporates a skillfully exe-
cuted parody of an actual Coors beer advertisement, including
the Coors logo, a satirical variation on Coors' then-current
advertising slogan, and professional models posing as clean-
cut, upbeat Coors beer drinkers. The argument that the ex-
cluded speech does not address otherwise includible commer-
cial subject matter is weak indeed when the speech in question
is an elaborate parody of an actual commercial advertise-
ment."0
The panel's view that Lebron could not establish viewpoint
discrimination because his advertisement does not address the
merits or demerits of Coors beer suggests that had Lebron
directly addressed the quality of the product (i.e., if his critique
of Coors were analogous to Ralph Nader's critique of GM cars
for being unsafe), he would have had a legitimate claim of
viewpoint discrimination. Presumably, in the panel's view, had
Lebron been addressing the quality of the Coors product, his
advertisement urging viewers to buy Budweiser instead of Coors because
Anheuser-Busch, unlike Coors, does not fund right-wing political causes (or because
it funds liberal causes such as the Sierra Club and the ACLU). Such an advertise-
ment obviously would have been both commercial and political, and it would be no
less controversial than Lebron's proposed advertisement.
' The rejection of Lebron's advertisement because it was political struck at the
conceptual heart of the work. The piece relies upon the subversion of the form
and content of commercial advertising to communicate its critique of consumer
culture. As an expos6 of what Lebron views as damaging uses of corporate profits,
the medium (a parody of an actual Coors beer advertisement) and the message
(the disturbing reality beneath the carefree gloss of Madison Avenue image-mak-
ing) are inextricably intertwined. The careful balance of mimicry and subversion in
the work depends upon Lebron's having access to a forum in which the mimicry
achieves a plausibility that, in turn, enhances the subversion. Lebron's political
message, in other words, was deliberately related both in form and in content to
the type of commercial speech that concededly is permitted on the Spectacular. It
would be a different case if Lebron's proposed advertisement were critical of the
administration's Middle East policy. Such an advertisement clearly would not re-
late to subject matter to which the Spectacular (as opposed to Penn Station adver-
tising) had been opened.
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advertisement would not have been political. But such an ad-
vertisement still would have been noncommercial, and thus,
under Amtrak's characterization of its policy as banning all
noncommercial advertisements on the Spectacular, it still could
have been barred.
In any event, it is difficult to see why a noncommercial
advertisement urging viewers not to buy a bad product would
be permissible whereas an equally noncommercial advertise-
ment urging viewers not to buy a product because the owner of
the company exploits his workers or funds abortion clinics
would not be. Both are engaging a subject-the desirability of
purchasing a product-that is permissible speech on the part of
the manufacturer of the product. To permit a product-oriented,
negative advertisement by Ralph Nader's Public Citizen orga-
nization but not a politics-oriented, negative advertisement
from Michael Lebron-as the Second Circuit's reasoning ap-
pears to allow-would seem to be viewpoint-based discrimina-
tion. The government may not define the contours of public
debate in such a manner.
The court took both too broad and too narrow a view of the
includible subject matter. By holding that a ban on all political
advertisements was viewpoint-neutral, it failed to look closely
enough at the specific subject matter at issue. By suggesting
that Lebron's work did not address an includible subject be-
cause it did not discuss the merits of Coors beer, the court
unduly restricted the scope of permissible speech on a commer-
cial subject. In short, the court's bases for rejecting Lebron's
claim of viewpoint discrimination are not conceptually sound.
At a minimum, the court's failure to explore the implications of
its "product versus politics" distinction is unsatisfying and
issue-begging.
5. Inconsistent Application
The panel's ruling as to whether Amtrak's policy had been
consistently applied depended entirely upon its finding that
the Amtrak policy applied only to the Spectacular. The district
court found it "clear beyond dispute" that Amtrak's policy had
not been followed consistently."' Yet the court of appeals had
22 Lebron I, 811 F. Supp. at 1004.
[Vol. 62:693
LEBRON V. NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORP.
no trouble disposing of the finding that the policy had been
inconsistently applied, since its finding that the forum was
limited to the Spectacular enabled it to exclude from its analy-
sis the Plain Truth advertisement, the political and public
service advertisements that are expressly permitted by TDrs
advertising guidelines,' and the advertisements placed by
such noncommercial organizations as the New York Depart-
ment of the Environment and the New York Department of
Commerce. Amazingly, even its concession in its revised opin-
ion that its finding regarding the scope of Amtrak's policy was
incorrect did not compel the panel to acknowledge the inconsis-
tency with which the policy had been applied. As Chief Judge
Newman aptly noted, the majority "concluded that the policy
has been consistently applied by overlooking the instances
where it has not been consistently applied."' 3
In defending Amtraks discretion to determine which non-
commercial advertisements were suitably innocuous to be dis-
played in the station, the court downplayed the significance of
the noncommercial advertisements identified by Lebron, call-
ing them "[a] handful of assertedly borderline cases.' Quot-
ing Chief Judge Newman's dissent from the courts first opin-
ion in the case, the court noted that the Spectacular "has not
become a forum for advertisements of such pointed political
content" as Lebron's advertisement.' While that may be
true, such fine discrimination between speakers on the basis of
content too closely approximates the very evil-censorship-
that the First Amendment forbids.
The district court noted that TDrs guidelines do not prohibit "politicalr ad-
vertisements but rather provide that they are to be treated as commercial
advertisements and are subject to full rate charge. I& at 1003, nol.
23 Lebron I7, 74 F.3d at 372 (Newman, C.J., dissenting).
=' Lebron I, 69 F.3d at 660.
Id& Chief Judge Newman made the observation in the context of discussing
the appropriate relief. Lebron v. National IMPR Passenger Corp., 12 F.3d at 394
(Newman, C.J., dissenting). In Lebron I, he criticized the majority for taking his
observation out of context, insisting that the statement "was directed solely at the
issue of the possible scope of reliet not the issue of liability ... ." 69 F.3d at
663.
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CONCLUSION
Lebron is not an encouraging case for those looking to the
Second Circuit for vigilant protection of First Amendment
rights. What can most generously be described as a casual
attitude toward the district court's factual findings, combined
with a wooden, insensitive interpretation of the public forum
doctrine, reflects a determination to accord the government
acting as a proprietor great discretion in controlling speech
access to its property.
While due regard for the government's right to manage its
commercial property in an efficient manner is an essential
component of public forum analysis, the right to selectively
exclude advertisers whose views may provoke controversy,
without the guidance of clear and coherent regulations that
draw such distinctions for valid reasons, cannot be squared
with the Constitution, regardless of the forum.
Cornelius226 best exemplifies the Supreme Court's reluc-
tance to second-guess the government's decisions as to the
speech access it will allow to public property that is not a tra-
ditional public forum. That reluctance flows from the centrality
of the government's intent to the forum designation analy-
sis." 7 Lebron is an extreme example of this deferential ap-
proach. Indeed, the court's refusal to modify its holding once it
was forced to recognize that the Spectacular was governed by
the same advertising standards as the rest of Penn Station left
nothing supporting the court's denial of Lebron's claim other
than deference.
The panel seems to have taken the view that the unusual
size and prominence of the Spectacular, as well as Amtrak's
role as a proprietor rather than a regulator, justified allowing
Amtrak greater discretion in controlling access to the space. A
more appropriate approach would have been just the opposite:
Since the greater prominence of speech on the Spectacular
relative to the other advertising spaces in the station made the
Spectacular a more significant means of communication and
heightened the likelihood that Amtrak would seek to suppress
' Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 803-04
(1985).
2' Id. at 802-03.
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controversial speech in that space, more searching scrutiny of
Amtralks regulation of the Spectacular would have been justi-
fied. That notion has particular force here, since for Lebron
there was no satisfactory alternative means of communicating
his message.'
Ironically, Lebron himself was stung by a curtailment of
constitutional rights not unlike that which he sought to bring
to the public's attention.
2' Id. at 803-04.
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